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Unspringing the Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every Judge and
Juror Needs to Know about Cognitive Psychology and Witness Credibility
Abstract
The soul of America's civil and criminal justice systems is the ability of jurors and judges to accurately
determine the facts of a dispute. This invariably implicates the credibility of witnesses. In making
credibility determinations, jurors and judges necessarily decide the accuracy of witnesses' memories and
the effect of the witnesses' demeanor on their credibility. Almost all jurisdictions' pattern jury instructions
about witness credibility explain nothing about how a witness's memories for events and conversations
work-and how startlingly fallible memories actually are. They simply instruct the jurors to consider the
witness's "memory" with no additional guidance. Similarly, the same pattern jury instructions on
demeanor seldom do more than ask jurors to speculate about a witness's demeanor by instructing them
to merely observe "the manner of the witness" while testifying. Yet, thousands of cognitive psychological
studies have provided major insights into witness memory and demeanor. The resulting cognitive
psychological principles that are now widely accepted as the gold standard about witness memory and
demeanor are often contrary to what jurors intuitively, but wrongly, believe. Most jurors believe that
memory works like a video camera that can perfectly recall the details of past events. Rather, memory is
more like a Wikipedia page where you can go in and change it, but so can everyone else. Memories are so
malleable, numerous, diverse, and innocuous that post-event information alters them, at times in very
dramatic ways. Memories can be distorted, contaminated, and even, with modest cues, falsely imagined.
For example, an extremely small universe of people have highly superior autobiographical memory
("HSAM"). They can recall past details (like the color of the shirt they were wearing on August 1,
1995)from memory almost as well as a video camera. HSAM individuals' memories are not infallible,
however. In one study, HSAM participantsfa lsely remembered seeing news film clips of United Flight 93
crashing in afield in Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001. No such film exists. Thus, no group that is free
from memory distortions has ever been discovered. In one interesting study, students on a college
campus were asked to either perform or imagine certain normal and bizarre actions: (1) check the Pepsi
machine for change; and (2) propose marriage to the Pepsi machine. Two weeks later, the students were
tested and demonstrated substantial imagination inflation leading to false recognition of whether they
performed or imagined the actions. Few legal principles are more deeply embedded in American
jurisprudence than the importance of demeanor evidence in deciding witness credibility. Historically,
demeanor evidence is one of the premises for the need for live testimony, the rule against hearsay, and
the right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Yet, cognitive
psychological studies have consistently established that the typical cultural cues that jurors rely on,
including averting eye contact, a furrowed brow, a trembling hand, and stammering speech, for example,
have little or nothing to do with a witness's truthfulness. Also, jurors all too often wrongly assume that
there is a strong correlation between a witness's confidence and the accuracy of that witness's testimony.
Studies have determined that jurors'perceptions of witness confidence are more important in determining
credibility than the witness's consistency or inconsistency. Another series of studies indicate that, in
reality, demeanor evidence predicts witness truthfulness about as accurately as a coin flip. Once the factfinder makes credibility determinations, it is nearly impossible to overturn those decisions on post-trial
motions or appeal. The secrecy with which credibility determinations are made promotes the legitimacy
of factfinding, but it also shrouds its countless failings. Despite years of overwhelming consensus among
cognitive psychology scholars and numerous warnings from thoughtful members of the legal academy,
judges have done virtually nothing to identify or to begin trying to solve this serious problem. The one
exception is eyewitness identification of suspects in criminal cases, where several state supreme courts
have relied heavily on cognitive psychological research to craft better science-based specialized jury
instructions. This Article examines and analyzes the often amazing and illuminating cognitive
psychological research on memory and demeanor. It concludes with a Proposed Model Plain English

Witness Credibility Instruction that synthesizes and incorporates much of this remarkable research.

This article is available in American University Law Review: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol64/
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ARTICLES
UNSPRINGING THE WITNESS MEMORY
AND DEMEANOR TRAP: WHAT EVERY
JUDGE AND JUROR NEEDS TO KNOW
ABOUT COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND
WITNESS CREDIBILITY
MARK W. BENNETT*

The soul of America's civil and criminal justice systems is the ability of
jurors and judges to accurately determine the facts of a dispute. This
invariably implicates the credibility of witnesses. In making credibility
determinations,jurors andjudges necessarily decide the accuracy of witnesses'
memories and the effect of the witnesses' demeanor on their credibility.
Almost all jurisdictions'pattern jury instructions about witness credibility
explain nothing about how a witness's memories for events and conversations
work-and how startlingly fallible memories actually are. They simply
instruct the jurors to consider the witness's "memory" with no additional
guidance. Similarly, the same patternjury instructionson demeanor seldom do
more than ask jurors to speculate about a witness's demeanor by instructing
them to merely observe "the manner of the witness" while testifying. Yet,
thousands of cognitivepsychological studies have provided major insights into
witness memory and demeanor. The resulting cognitivepsychological principles
that are now widely accepted as the gold standardabout witness memory and
demeanor are often contrary to what jurors intuitively, but wrongly, believe.
Most jurors believe that memory works like a video camera that can perfectly
recall the details of past events. Rather, memory is more like a Wikipedia page
where you can go in and change it, but so can everyone else. Memories are so
* The Honorable Mark W. Bennett is in his twenty-first year as a judge on the
United States District Court the Northern District of Iowa.
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malleable, numerous, diverse, and innocuous that post-event information alters
them, at times in very dramatic ways. Memories can be distorted, contaminated,
and even, with modest cues, falsely imagined. For example, an extremely small
universe of people have highly superior autobiographicalmemory ("HSAM").
They can recall past details (like the color of the shirt they were wearing on
August 1, 1995)from memory almost as well as a video camera.
HSAM individuals' memories are not infallible, however. In one study, HSAM
participantsfalsely remembered seeing newsfilm clips of United Flight 93 crashing
in afield in Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001. No such film exists. Thus, no
group that is free from memory distortions has ever been discovered. In one
interesting study, students on a college campus were asked to either perform or
imagine certain normal and bizarre actions: (1) check the Pepsi machine for
change; and (2) propose marriage to the Pepsi machine. Two weeks later, the
students were tested and demonstrated substantialimagination inflation leading
to false recognition of whether they performed or imagined the actions.
Few legal principles are more deeply embedded in American jurisprudence
than the importance of demeanor evidence in deciding witness credibility.
Historically, demeanor evidence is one of the premises for the need for live
testimony, the rule against hearsay, and the right of confrontation under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Yet, cognitive psychological
studies have consistently established that the typical culturalcues thatjurors rely
on, including averting eye contact, a furrowed brow, a trembling hand, and
stammering speech, for example, have little or nothing to do with a witness's
truthfulness. Also, jurors all too often wrongly assume that there is a strong
correlation between a witness's confidence and the accuracy of that witness's
testimony. Studies have determined thatjurors'perceptionsof witness confidence
are more important in determining credibility than the witness's consistency or
inconsistency. Another series of studies indicate that, in reality, demeanor
evidence predicts witness truthfulness about as accurately as a coinflip.
Once the fact-finder makes credibility determinations, it is nearly impossible
to overturn those decisions on post-trial motions or appeal. The secrecy with
which credibility determinations are made promotes the legitimacy offactfinding, but it also shrouds its countless failings. Despite years of
overwhelming consensus among cognitive psychology scholars and numerous
warnings from thoughtful members of the legal academy, judges have done
virtually nothing to identify or to begin trying to solve this serious problem. The
one exception is eyewitness identification of suspects in criminal cases, where
several state supreme courts have relied heavily on cognitive psychological
research to craft betterscience-based specializedjury instructions.
This Article examines and analyzes the often amazing and illuminating
cognitive psychological research on memory and demeanor. It concludes with a
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Proposed Model Plain English Witness Credibility Instruction that synthesizes
and incorporatesmuch of this remarkableresearch.
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"Remembrance of things past is not necessarily the remembrance of things as
they were." - Marcel Proust

INTRODUCTION

The soul of the civil and criminal justice systems in the United
States is the ability of jurors (and judges) to ferret out truth from
falsehood. At bottom, trials are simply an attempt to recreate past
events through exhibits and witnesses' memories. The stark reality is
that jurors, like the rest of us (including judges), are not very good at
determining witness credibility based on a witness's memory and
demeanor-the two most important historical and current guides.
This is certainly not the fault of jurors. It is, however, the fault of the
legal system's inability to adapt the overwhelming and growing body
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of cognitive psychological and neuroscience research into more
science-based jury instructions. Because this issue goes to the core of
our justice system, judges are long past due in unveiling this problem
and doing something about it.'
Over two decades ago, Professor H. Richard Uviller phrased the
issue this way: "The central question, vital to our adjudicative model,
is: h]ow well can we expect a jury to determine credibility through
the ordinary adversary processes of live testimony and vigorous
impeachment? The answer, from all I have been able to see, is: not
very well."'2 Jurors' judgments about the credibility of a witness's
memory and demeanor are virtually unreviewable.' Thus, the jury's
secrecy promotes its legitimacy and, in doing so, shrouds its failings.
Unfortunately, other than in the limited but critical area of eyewitness
identification of suspects in criminal cases,' which isbeyond the scope

1. Over one hundred years ago, Sigmund Freud, in a lecture to a law class at the
University of Vienna, stated: "There is a growing recognition of the untrustworthiness
of statements made by witnesses, at present the basis for so many judgments in Courts
of Law .. " Sigmund Freud, Psycho-Analysis and the Ascertainingof Truth in Courts of Law,
in 2 COLLCrED PAPERS 13 (ErnestJones ed.,Joan Riviera trans., 1959).
2. H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character,and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through
the Liar's Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 827 (1993).
3. See infra Part I (providing an overview of memory research); see also infra note 93
(noting the importance of a face-to-face confrontation between the witness and the jury).
4. No other aspect of witness memory has received more attention from cognitive
psychologists, neuroscientists, lawyers, and judges. See Adam Liptak, 34 Years Later,
(Aug. 22, 2011),
Supreme Court Will Revisit Eyewitness IDs, NY TIMEs
This is, of course, most
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/us/23bar.html?_r=l.
appropriate because of the growing awareness of wrongful convictions and the fact that
inaccurate eyewitness identification is the major culprit. "The Innocence Project, a
'national litigation and public policy organization dedicated to exonerating wrongfully
convicted people,' estimates that eyewitness identification was a factor in seventy-five
percent of convictions overturned through DNA testing, making it the 'single greatest
cause of wrongful convictions' in the United States." MatthewJ. Reedy, Note, Witnessing
the Witness: The Case for Exclusion of Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
905, 906 (2011) (footnotes omitted). Others estimate that "'[m]ore than 4250
Americans per year are wrongfully convicted due to sincere, yet woefully inaccurate
eyewitness identifications."' Id. at 906-07 (footnote omitted); see also State v.
Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 884 (NJ. 2011) (adopting most of a special master's report
following an evidentiary hearing involving seven experts on memory and eyewitness
identification, 2000 pages of transcript, more than 360 exhibits containing more than
200 published scientific studies on human memory and eyewitness identification, and
ordering major revisions to jury instructions on eyewitness identification based on the
court's adoption of the scientific evidence presented). The court in Henderson also
noted that "more than two thousand studies related to eyewitness identification have
been published in the past thirty years." Id. at 892.
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of this Article, little has been done to assist jurors in accurately
determining witness credibility.
I have tried hundreds of criminal and civil jury trials and many
bench trials. Not surprisingly, fact disputes created by witnesses have
been at the epicenter of virtually every trial. Was the defendant, Mr.
Gill, the person that robbed the bank? Was the traffic light red or
green when Ms. Sadden drove through the intersection? Did the
supervisor, Mr. Meis, repeatedly grope his secretary, Ms. Wrenn? Did
Mr. Zoss
know
the
package
he
delivered
contained
methamphetamine? The triers of fact are tasked with answering such
questions by ferreting out truth from witnesses and exhibits. Indeed,
civil and criminal trials are, "among other things,... attempt[s] to
reconstruct a past event to aid the trier of fact in determining what
happened."5 But, the "truth" of what actually happened in the past is
a more elusive concept than what it might seem at first blush. There
is often a huge gap between perceived truth and objective truth.
Witnesses can be truthful, but for many reasons mistaken. For
example, witnesses may be sure that: Mr. Gill robbed the bank, when
in fact Mr. Gill was 1500 miles away in Cabo San Lucas; Mrs. Sadden
had the green light, when in fact she ran a red light according to the
video from the red light camera; they saw Mr. Meis grope Ms. Wrenn,
when in fact they only heard about it second-hand; they thought Mr.
Zoss admitted his involvement in the conspiracy, when it was actually
a statement by another person.
It has long been known that "[w]e have limited computational
skills and seriously flawed memories.... To deal with limited brain
power and time[,] we use mental shortcuts and rules of thumb. But
even with these remedies, and in some cases because of these
remedies,... [our] use of mental shortcuts.., can produce
predictable mistakes."6 Thus, the human mind, as a processor of
information, does not reach its own ideal. 7 A great myth of human
memory is that the human brain is aliving filing cabinet, storing fully
intact memories and allowing them to be pulled out, unmarred.8

5. GARY L. WELLS & ELIZABETH F. LoFTus, Eyewitness Memory forPeople and Events, in
11 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY, FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 149 (2013).
6. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 1471, 1477 (1998).
7. Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error,
57 STAN. L. REv. 291, 292 (2004).
8. Traci Pederson, For Memory, Brain is a Network, Not a File Cabinet,
PSYCHCENTRAL,
http://psychcentral.com/news/2OlO/11/O6/for-memory-brain-is-a-networknot-afile-cabinet/20594.html(last visited Aug. 9, 2015).
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"The act of remembering," according to Elizabeth F. Loftus,
psychologist and memory researcher at the University of California,
Irvine, "is more akin to putting puzzle pieces together than retrieving
a video recording."9 As Professor Jennifer Bard wrote: "So long aswe
conceive of the brain as a digital camera where information from the
senses [is] stored intact for future retrieval, we will continue to
overvalue the role of memory."' l In a similar vein, the former chair
of the Department of Psychology at Harvard, Daniel L. Schacter,
asserted that "we tend to think of memories as snapshots from family
albums that, if stored properly, could be retrieved in precisely the
same condition in which they were put away."" Schacter notes that
our memories actually work differently. 2 He describes a process
where our brain extracts and stores important elements from our
experiences. 3 Our brains then either "recreate or reconstruct our
experiences rather than retrieve copies of them.""' However, in this
process of recreating or reconstructing, "we add on feelings, beliefs,
or even knowledge we obtained after the experience." 5 Thus, "we
bias our memories of the past by attributing to them emotions or
knowledge we acquired after the event."1 Because memory is not
like a video camera that can perfectly recall images of past events, it is
fraught with potential mischief. "

9. Hal Arkowitz & Scott 0. Lilienfeld, Why Science Tells Us Not to Rely on Eyewitness
Accounts, SCl. Am. (Jan. 8, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-the-eyes-have-it. "Prof[essor] Loftus is
one of the leading experts on memory. She is credited with developing the
misinformation effect theory, which supports the concept that the memories of
eyewitnesses are revised by being exposed to incorrect information, and that memory
is not static or unchangeable." Robert A. Creo, Memory Is Not a Video Recording, 31
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIGATION

51, 51 (2013).

10. Jennifer S. Bard, "Oh Yes, I Remember it Well".- Why the Inherent Unreliability ofHuman
Memory Makes Brain Imaging Technology a Poor Measure of Truth-Telling in the Courtroom 3
(2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1813425. This article presents a terrific deconstruction
of why MRI brain imaging technology is not currently capable of determining a truthteller from a liar, despite some private software companies' contrary claims.

11. DANIEL L. SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINS OF MEMORY: How THE MIND FORGETS AND
REMEMBERS 9 (2001) [hereinafter SCHACTER, How THE MIND FORGETS AND REMEMBERS].
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id. (explaining that false memories can occur because memories are
susceptible to being influenced by, for example, an attorney's leading questions).
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How accurately does the average person recall specific details of
events witnessed over his or her lifetime? 8 Apparently not very well. ,'
"It is well documented that most people are markedly inaccurate in
reporting such numerical details as time, speed, and distance."2 For
example, in one test of Air Force personnel who knew in advance they
would be questioned about the speed of vehicles involved in an
accident, participants estimated ranges from ten to fifty miles per hour
when the vehicle they had watched was actually going only twelve miles
per hour.2
As this study reveals, the ways in which information
regarding speed and details of an accident are reported are influenced
by the type of questions asked.22 The difference between being asked
about the speed of vehicles observed in a film of an accident using the
verb "smashed," and using verbs such as "hit, contacted, or collided,"
resulted in a higher estimate of speed.23
Notably, in a related
experiment, one week after watching the video of a vehicle accident,
the subjects were asked if they saw any broken glass in the video (there
was none).4 The subjects asked about the "smashing" a week earlier
claimed they had seen broken glass at a higher rate than those asked
how fast the vehicles were going when they "hit" each other.25 Loftus
and Palmer explained the results this way:
As a framework for discussing these results, we would like to
propose that two kinds of information go into one's memory for
some complex occurrence. The first is information gleaned during
the perception of the original event; the second is external
information supplied after the fact. Over time, information from
these two sources may be integrated in such a way that we are

18. Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction ofAutomobile Destruction:
An Example of the Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13J. VERBAL LEARNING &
VERBAL BEHAV. 585, 585 (1974).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 586. Loftus and Palmer found that "two interpretations of this finding
are possible." Id. First, they hypothesized "that the differential speed estimates result
merely from response-bias factors. A subject is uncertain whether to say 30 [] or 40
[miles per hour], for example, and the verb smashed biases his response towards the
higher estimate." Id. Second, the authors hypothesized "that the question form
causes a change in the subject's memory representation of the accident. The verb
smashed may change a subject's memory such that he 'sees' the accident as being
more severe than it actually was." Id. at 586-87.
24. Id. at587.
25. Id. at 587-88.
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unable to tell from which source
some specific detail is recalled.
26
All we have is one "memory."
Thus, the person's recollection of the accident combines with the
external term "smashed" and becomes integrated into that person's
memory. 27 This causes the subject to both remember "an accident
that was more severe than in fact it was" and "to think that broken
glass was present" when in fact it was not.2s This is butone example
of how the memory of witnesses is so fallible. "Memory, like liberty, is
a fragile thing." 29 Professor Loftus described memory as being like a
Wikipedia page: "you can go in and change it, but so can others."30
If witnesses' memories are not as accurate as we think, are jurors at
least good at determining witness credibility based on demeanor? The
American justice system's longstanding reliance on evaluating a
witness's credibility based upon his demeanor, so-called "demeanor
evidence," has long been a pillar in jurisprudence."'
Thus,
psychology professorJeremy Blumenthal wrote:
Relying on a principle almost three thousand years old, the legal
community has instilled in its judicial framework the fundamental
premise that "the opportunity... to view the demeanor of a witness is
of great value" in deciding whether that witness is telling the truth.
Since ascertaining truth is the very function of the trial, the deliberate
perpetuation of any such device which reputedly enhances "the
accuracy of the truth-determining process" is hardly surprising. The
principle can be traced as ajuridical axiom from the times of the early
Roman judex to the [T]hirteenth- and [F]ourteenth-century
Postglossators, through the earliest English common law to the
foundations of this country's early legal reasoning. 32

Demeanor evidence refers, in part, to a witness's alleged cues while
testifying, including facial expressions, eye contact, attitude, body
language, length of pauses, hesitation, sincerity, gestures, candor,
tone of voice, expression, dress, grooming habits, and level of
confidence.33 Demeanor evidence is so ingrained in American

26. Id. at 588.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Elizabeth Loftus, How Reliable is Your Memory?, TED TALK (June 2013),
http://www.ted.com/talks/elizabeth-loftus-the fiction-of-memory?language=en.
30. Id.
31. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validityof
Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB.L.REv. 1157, 1158 (1993).
32. Id. (footnotes omitted).
33. Gregory L. Ogden, The Role of Demeanor Evidence in Determining Credibility of
Witnesses in Fact Finding: The Views of ALJS, 20 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 3
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jurisprudence that it has been used to provide "historical and
modern justification for public trials[

]... crucial for determining

whether a witness is telling the truth or a falsehood[,] ... [and] has
been considered part of the right to confront witnesses since before
the adoption of the U.S. [C]onstitution." 4
Based on their assessment of witnesses' demeanor, jurors may
believe any of the following: Mr. Gill's failure to look them in the eye
is strong evidence he was lying and therefore reject his alibi that he
was in Cabo San Lucas; Ms. Sadden was not truthful in testifying she
had the green light because she testified haltingly; Mr. Meis was
untruthful in his denial of groping because of perceived nervous
hand gestures; or Mr. Zoss was guilty because he lacked the perceived
confidence of a truly innocent person. Yet, the literature casts serious
doubt as to whether such demeanor-based assessments are reliable.
A hefty body of cognitive psychological research, virtually without
dissent, "casts significant doubt on the core assumption behind the
weight given to demeanor evidence in making credibility
This research establishes that the cues of
determinations. '' 35
credibility, long considered the core of demeanor evidence, do
nothing to enhance jurors' ability to discern whether a witness is
lying, telling the truth, or, despite her sincerity, misremembering or
completely mistaking his testimony. 6 In sum, "we put jurors to the
intractable task of searching the faces and gestures of strangers for
the signs of deceit. Our unguarded confidence that jurors are up to
37
this task is the more remarkable for being so probably wrong.
What can we learn about the memory of fact-witnesses and their
demeanor and credibility based on the staggering quantity of
cognitive psychological research generated over the last quarter
Should this knowledge alter the standard witness
century?
recollection and credibility instructions that are used in courts across
the nation? Should courts, informed by this established science, take
(2000); see also James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 903, 907,
921, 939 (2000) (determining that demeanor evidence includes dress, behavior,
gestures, expression, long pauses between words, and eye contact).
34. Ogden, supra note 33, at 3 (footnotes omitted).
35. Id. at 3-4 (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 4. But see Max Minzner, DetectingLies Using Demeanor, Biasand Context, 29
CARDozo L. REv. 2557, 2564 (2008) (suggestingthat "[I]egal critics deride demeanor
evidence and conclude that lie detection is essentially impossible; courts depend on
it[,] ...
[but] neither view is right"). Minzner concludes that "context" in lie
detection is important and that not enough is known yet to support "the currently
skeptical view on legal lie detection." Id. at2578.
37. George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 578 (1997).
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a different approach in educating jurors on witness credibility? Part
II of this Article provides an overview of memory research and how
witnesses' memories work or do not work. Part III provides an
overview of demeanor evidence.
Part IV discusses how judges
presently instruct jurors on witness memory and demeanor. The
penultimate and core section, Part V, discusses and analyzes research
on juror misunderstanding of jury instructions and surveys principles
of cognitive psychology relevant to memory and demeanor. Part VI,
the final section, proposes a plain English model jury instruction on
witness credibility, incorporating the teachings of cognitive
psychology on memory and demeanor.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF MEMORY RESEARCH

The arc of thinking and writing about human memory reaches
back at least 2000 years to Aristotle's treatise on the nature of living
things, On the Soul.38 Aristotle compared the human brain "to a blank
slate and theorized that all humans are born free of any knowledge
and are merely the sum of their experiences.""
Aristotle also
compared memory to "making impressions in wax, sometimes
referred to as the 'storehouse metaphor,' a theory of memory which
held sway for many centuries.""'

Aristotle's blank slate, or "tabula

rasa," theory favored the nurture side of the nature versus nurture
debate. But his theory remained untouched until the Eleventh
Century Persian philosopher Avicenna featured it in his works,
followed by John Locke in his well-known treatment of the theory in
4
the Seventeenth Century. '

Research testing the ancient theories on memory and forgetting is
of more recent vintage. Professor Loftus asserts that "[f]orgetting is
one of the oldest topics in the field of psychological science, dating
back at least to [Hermann] Ebbinghaus .... ,,4'
Ebbinghaus is
credited with the discovery of the "forgetting curve," an early
psychological term describing the brain's inability to retain

38. ARISTOTLE, On the Sou4 in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 641 (Jonathan
Barnes, ed.,J.A. Smith, trans., 1984) (c. 350 B.C.E.).
39. The Study of Human Memory, THE HUMAN MEMORY, http://www.humanmemory.net/intro study.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2015).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Repressed and Recovered Memory, in BEYOND COMMON
SENSE:

PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM

Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008).

177, 179 (Eugene Borgida &
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information over time.

3

He is also credited as the first "to study the

forgetting behavior in an experimental, scientific way.""4 He used
himself as a subject to create groundbreaking research on
memorizing and subsequently forgetting nonsense, three-letter
words. 5 Examples of such words are "KAF" or "WID." 4' He created
over 2300 of these words, each with a vowel between two
consonants. 47 Ebbinghaus performed a series of tests on himself in
two periods, 1879-80 and 1883-84, and extended each over more
than a year.4 8 He then analyzed his data to determine the shape of
the forgetting curve, finding that forgetting is exponential in nature
(memory decreases at a geometric rather than an arithmetic rate). 9
Ebbinghaus tested his recollection of the data at six intervals, ranging
from one hour to one month. 5 He noted a clear and "rapid drop-off
43. The ForgettingCurve, FLASHcARD LEARNER, http://www.flashcardlearner.com/
articles/the-forgetting-curve (last visited Aug. 9, 2015).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. HERMANN EBBINGHAUS, MEMORY:
A CONTRIBUTION TO EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY 22 (Henry A. Ruger & Clara E. Bussenius trans., 1964).
48. Hermann Ebbinghaus-A Pioneer of Memory Research, FLASHCARD LEARNER,
http://www.flashcardlearner.com/articles/hermann-ebbinghaus-a-pioneer-of-memoiyresearch. In a 2012 article presenting a current fictional conversation with Hermann
Ebbinghaus (he died in 1909), Professor Elizabeth Loftus, and her co-author, Eryn J.
Newman, discussed with Ebbinghaus how subjects for memory studies are recruited today:
It seemed appropriate to talk about the matter of how many subjects one
typically sees in a memory study, so this was the first issue on which we
updated Ebbinghaus (who said we could call him Hermann). We told him
that we run experiments not on ourselves but with groups of subjects, and
sometimes the groups are quite large. In fact, one recent study involved over
2000 subjects whose memories of the events of September 11th were tested.
We added that subjects are often diverse; students of psychology and
members of the public, young children, older adults and clinical
populations[,] including people suffering from depression and anxiety.
"How do you find such diverse groups to study?" he asked. We explained
that you can find them in train stations and shopping malls (we had to
explain that one), and other public places. But a great new source is to find
the subjects online. "Online?[] [I]s that in Europe?" he wondered. After
explaining to him, the best we could, what the Internet was all about, we told
him about one of its big advantages; researchers don't even have to be in
proximity of their research subjects in order to run studies; they can be sitting at
their offices writing manuscripts and preparing teaching material and the study
marches on. "That seems like a more efficient route to tenure," he quipped.
Eryn J. Newman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, UpdatingEbbinghaus on the Science of Memory, 8
EUR.'SJ. PSYCHOLOGY 209, 209-10 (2012) (citation omitted).
49. The ForgettingCurve, supranote 43.
50. SCHACTER, HOW THE MIND FORGETS AND REMEMBERS, supra note 11, at 13.
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in retention during the first few tests; nine hours after he studied a
list of nonsense syllables, he had forgotten approximately [sixty]
percent of the list."'" The rate of forgetting then slowed down
considerably,5 2 establishing the shape of the forgetting curve. One
month later, Ebbinghaus had forgotten seventy-five percent of the
5
nonsense syllables-not much of a drop-off from the nine-hour test.
Interestingly, Ebbinghaus was skeptical about the future of memory
research, writing:
It remains to be proved whether, in spite of the clearest insight into
the inadequacy of our knowledge, we shall ever make any actual
progress. Perhaps we shall always have to be resigned to this.... If
by any chance a way to a deeper penetration into this matter should
present itself, surely, considering the significance of memory for all
mental phenomena, it should be our wish to enter that path at
once. For at the very worst we should prefer to see resignation arise
from the failure of earnest investigations rather than from
54
persistent, helpless astonishment in the face of their difficulties.
If Ebbinghaus, the founding pioneer in memory research, were alive
today, he would no doubt be astounded by the progress of cognitive
psychological research on memory and forgetting.
In 1999, ninety years after Ebbinghaus's death, Daniel L. Schacter,
Professor of Psychology at Harvard University, published a scholarly
article, The Seven Sins of Memory,55 followed by a book of the same title
two years later.56 Schacter posited that while psychologists and
neuroscientists had published scores of articles on "specific aspects of
forgetting or memory distortions, ... no unified framework has
conceptualized the various ways in which memory sometimes leads us
astray."5 7 The article and book proposed to fix this by asserting "that
memory's malfunctions can be divided into seven fundamental
transgressions or 'sins.'... "58 They are:

0

Transience: "a weakening or loss of memory over time. "59

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. At 13-14.
54. EBBINGHAUS, supra note 47, at 5-6.
55. Daniel L. Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights from Psychology and
Cognitive Neuroscience, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 182 (1999) [hereinafter Schacter, Insightsfrom
Psychology and Neuroscience].
56. SCIACTER, HOW THE MIND FORGETS AND REMEMBERS, supra note 11, at 4.
57. Id. at 4.
58. Id. at 4; Schacter, Insightsfrom Psychology and Neuroscience,supra note 55, at 182-83.
59. SCHACTER, How THE MIND FORGETS AND REMEMBERS, supra note 11, at 4.
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Absent-mindedness: "a breakdown at the interface between
attention and memory. Absent-minded memory errorsmisplacing keys or eyeglasses, or forgetting a lunch
appointment-typically occur because we are preoccupied
with distracting issues or concerns[] and don't focus attention
on what we need to remember. The desired information isn't
lost over time; it is either never registered in memory to begin
with, or not sought after at the moment it is needed, because
attention is focused elsewhere."6
* Blocking: "a thwarted search for information that we may be
desperately trying to retrieve. We've all failed to produce a
name to accompany a familiar face.
This frustrating
experience happens even though we are attending carefuilly to
the task at hand, and even though the desired name has not
faded from our minds-as we become acutely aware when we
unexpectedly retrieve the blocked name hours or days later.""1
* Misattribution: "assigning a memory to the wrong source: mistaking
fantasy for reality, or incorrectly remembering that a friend told you
a bit of trivia that you actually read about in a newspaper.
Misattribution is far more common than most people realize[] and
has potentially profound implications in legal settings."62
* Suggestibility: "memories that are implanted as a result of
leading questions, comments, or suggestions when a person is
trying to call up a past experience. Like misattribution,
suggestibility is especially relevant to-and sometimes can
wreak havoc within-the legal system. '"63
* Bias: "powerful influences of our current knowledge and
beliefs on how we remember our pasts. We often edit or
entirely rewrite our previous experiences-unknowingly and
unconsciously-in light of what we now know or believe. The
result can be a skewed rendering of a specific incident, or
even of an extended period in our lives, which says more
about how we feel now than about what happened then."64
" Persistence: "repeated recall of disturbing information or
events that we would prefer to banish from our minds
"

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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whatwe cannot forget, even though
altogether: remembering
65
we wish that we could."

The first three of Schacter's memory sins, "[t]ransience, absentmindedness, and blocking are sins of omission [in the sense that] we
fail to bring to mind a desired fact, event, or idea."6 6 In contrast to the
first three, the last "four [memory] sins[-] misattribution,
suggestibility, bias, and persistence [-]are.., sins of commission" in
the sense that "some form of memory is present, but it is either
incorrect or unwanted."6 7 Although it does not appear that other
memory researchers have embraced Schacter's framework,68 this
comes as no surprise because it was conceived for lay folks-not
Like Schacter's
cognitive psychologists and neuroscienfists.
framework, this Article is not directed at psychologists and
neuroscientists. Accordingly, our focus will be on transience and three
of the four sins of commission: misattribution, suggestibility, and bias.
The "misinformation effect" is a term incorporating many of the
seven sins of memory. It connotes that memory of an event is often
altered by the receipt of post-event misinformation.6"
There are a very small number of people who have virtually total
70
recall of the detailed moment-to-moment events of their entire lives.
Three neuroscientists have proposed the term "hyperthymesia" to
describe this phenomenon: an unparalleled superior memory to
recall autobiographical life information. 7' These individuals "appear
to be uniquely gifted in their ability to accurately remember even
trivial details from their distant past." 72 Professor Loftus and others
refer to hyperthymesia as "[h]ighly superior autobiographical
Fascinatingly, HSAM "individuals can
memory (HSAM) ."7

65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 4.

67. Id. at 5.
68. See, e.g.,
State v. Henderson, 27 A.2d 872 (N.J. 2011) (citing a plethora of
studies, but not Schacter's Seven Sins); WELLS & Lorrus, supra note 5, at 149-50
(same); Newman & Loftus, supra note 48,at 210 (same).
69. WELLS & Lovrus, supra note 5, at 153. This concept is discussed in greater
detail in Part V.B.2.
70.

See Elizabeth

S.

Parker et al.,

A

Case of Unusual Autobiographical

Remembering, 12 NEUROCASE 35 (2006) (asserting that the subject of the report is
the first reported case of someone remembering a vast amount of personal
details without having used mnemonic devices).
71. Id. at 47.
72. Lawrence Patihis et al., False Memories in Highly Superior Autobiographical
Memory Individuals, 110 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 20,947, 20,947 (2013).
73. Id.
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remember the day of the week a date fell on and details of what
happened that day from every day of their life since mid-childhood."74
For verified details, researchers' measurements of HSAM individuals'
memories show that they are accurate ninety-seven percent of the
time.7 5 The rare capacity of such persons for recalling events
conjures up the videotape recording analogy of memory that has
been scientifically discarded for the rest of us. Are these rare
individuals immune from-or at least less likely to be affected bymisattribution, suggestibility, bias, the misinformation effect, or other
memory distortions? What can be learned from studying them?
Intriguingly, HSAM individuals are as susceptible to memory
distortions and false memories as everyone else is. 76 For example,
participants with HSAM falsely remembered seeing news clips of
United Flight 93 crashing in a field in Pennsylvania on September 11,
2001." 7 No such film exists.78 This seemingly paradoxical result led
researchers to conclude that while it is "always possible that some
group might be found to be immune to memory distortions, none has
as [of] yet been discovered."7' Thus, there is not a scintilla of cognitive
evidence suggesting witnesses in both civil and criminal trials are free
from or less susceptible to memory distortions than anyone else.
It is important to briefly mention the processes of memory-producing
distortion and failure.
Modem cognitive psychological and
neuroscience research suggests that "human memory systems operate in
three general stages: (1) acquisition (or encoding), when information is
first transferred into our memory system; (2) storage,when information is
maintained in [our] memor[ies] over a period of time; and (3) retrieval
when information is located and retrieved from storage."8 At each of
these three stages, or in any combination, memories may be distorted,
contaminated, compromised, or falsely created.8 1

74.
75.

Id.
Id.

76. Id. at20,949-50.
77. Id., Supporting Information, at 2, http://www.pnas.org/content/suppl/2013/
11/13/1314373110.DCSupplemental/pnas.201314373SI.pdf
(Supporting Information
available in an online-only PDF).
78.

Id.

79.

Id. at 20,952.

80.

Deborah Davis et al., Memoiyfor Conversation on Trial, in HANDBOOK OF HuMAN

FAcTORs IN LITIGATION 12-1, 12-1-12-2 (2005); see State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872,
894 (NJ. 2011) (citing ELIZABETH F. LoFrus, EYEwITNESs TESTIMONY 21 (2d ed. 1996))
(reiterating the three stages).
81. Davis, supra note 80, at 12-2; Henderson, 27 A.3d at 894 (citing LoIrus, supra

note 80, at 21).

1346

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

II.

[Vol. 64:1331

AN OVERVIEW OF DEMEANOR EVIDENCE

Three thousand years ago, the demeanor of a liar was described: "He
does not answer questions, or they are evasive answers; he speaks
nonsense, rubs the great toe along the ground, and shivers; his face is
discolored; he rubs the roots of the hair with his fingers .... , 2
Relying on this ancient principle of demeanor and its enduring
significance in jurisprudence, belief in the view that demeanor
evidence is central to witness credibility is a fundamental principle of
Few legal principles in
our contemporary judicial system. 83
contemporary American jurisprudence are more entrenched than the
notion that demeanor evidence is important in deciding witness
credibility.84 Nearly half a century ago, Judge Abraham Freedman
wrote:
Demeanor is of the utmost importance in the determination of the
credibility of a witness. The innumerable telltale indications [that] fall
from a witness during the course of his examination are often much
more of an indication to judge or jury of his credibility and the
reliability of his evidence than is the literal meaning of his words.85
More recently, Professor Olin Wellborn concluded that "[t]he
notion that viewing the appearance and demeanor of a witness
significantly assists a trier of fact to determine the truthfulness of the
witness's testimony appears to be as ancient as testimony itself." 6
Indeed, John Henry Wigmore, the noted evidence scholar and
former dean of the Northwestern University School of Law, wrote that
demeanor evidence, "without any definite rules as to its significance,
is always assumed to be in evidence."8 7 Wigmore further noted that
"[t]he appearance and manner, the voice, the gestures,... the
passions which move or control-fear, love, hate, envy, or revenge-

82.

Paul V. Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection, 29J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

848, 849 (1939) (citing the Ayur-Veda). For a comprehensive discussion of the
expanding historical role of the jury as a detector of witness credibility, see generally
George Fisher, Thejury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575 (1997).
83. Blumenthal, supra note 31, at 1158.
84. The jury's role in deciphering witness demeanor is relatively new. Professor
George Fisher traces this back to the Georgia Supreme Court decision Humphries v.
State, 28 S.E. 25, 26 (Ga. 1897) (holding that when instructed to consider the relative
weight of positive and negative testimony, the jury should also be instructed to assess
witness credibility). Fisher, supra note 37, at 636 n.276.
85. Gov't of the V.I. v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 548 (3rd Cir. 1967).
86. Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1104 (1991).
87. 33A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 496, at 7

(rev. ed. 1970).
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are all open to observation, noted and weighed by the jury.""8
Additionally, the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of
Evidence state that "[tlhe demeanor of the witness traditionally has
been believed to furnish trier and opponent with valuable clues." 9
Demeanor evidence has historically been deemed so important as to
be a justification of the need for "live testimony, the hearsay rle, and
the right of confrontation" under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution."0 The Federal Rules of Evidence express a strong
preference for live testimony, which further justifies the observation of
a witness's demeanor.9" Similarly, a "traditional justification for the
hearsay prohibition was that out-of-court statements were made
'without [the] opportunity for the court, jury, or parties to observe the
[witnesses'] demeanor. .. .' "', In a late Nineteenth Century decision,
the United States Supreme Court noted the importance of witness
demeanor as a feature of face-to-face confrontation:
[T] he accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection
and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to
stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and
judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he
9
gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. "

In 1988, Justice Scalia's majority opinion in
the element of face-to-face confrontation was
meaning of the [Confrontation] Clause"
confrontation reflects the idea that "there

88.

Coy v. Iowa94 noted that
the "irreducible literal
and that face-to-face
is something deep in

5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1395, at 153

(rev. ed. 1970) (citation omitted).
89. FED. R. EVID. ART. VIII advisory committee's notes (Proposed Rules 1972)
(citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495-96 (1951)).
90. Wellborn III, supra note 86, at 1077.
91. 8JAMEs WM. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAclncE § 43.02 [2] (3d ed. 2015); see also
FED. R. CiM. P. 26 ("In every trial[,] the testimony of witnesses must be taken in open
court, unless otherwise provided...."); FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) ("At trial, the witnesses'
testimony must be taken in open court unless... [other rules] provide otherwise.").
92. Chet K.W. Pager, Blind Justice, Colored Truths and the Veil of Ignorance, 41
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 373, 377 (2005) (footnote omitted); see Ogden, supranote 33, at
3 ("The opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness while testifying provides
historical and modern justification for public trials in which the fact finder observes
the witness testify in a face to face hearing. Demeanor evidence has been assumed to
be crucial for determining whether a witness is telling the truth or a falsehood. The
rules of law governing live testimony, confrontation rights, and hearsay rules have all
been shaped by this assumption about demeanor evidence." (footnote omitted)).
93. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43(1895).
94. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
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... as 'essential
human nature that regards face-to-face 9confrontation
5
prosecution."
criminal
a
in
trial
to a fair

The following section describes the current way trial court judges
(and I was one of them until I researched this Article) inadequately
instructjurors on witness memory and demeanor.
III. HOWJUDGES INSTRUCTJURORS ON WITNESS MEMORY AND
DEMEANOR

Written jury instructions are the current method by which judges
inform jurors about the law in each case and how to apply the law to the
facts. 6 "In carrying out the instructional task, every trial judge seeks to
ensure that the applicable law is stated accurately and completely, a goal
that was specified as early as 1895 in Sparf v. United States."97 There are
other goals as well. Pattern instructions have achieved popularity across
the country as a modern guide for various reasons;" they decrease the
95. Id. at 1017, 1021 (citations omitted).
96. As late as 1979, the predominant method of instructing juries was for the
judge to give oral instructions to the jury, and 'jurors rarely [had] access to a printed
copy of the instructions. .. ." Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal
Language Understandable: A PsycholinguisticStudy ofJury Instructions,79 COLUM. L. REV.

1306, 1310 (1979) (explaining the authors' early classic study on plain English
rewriting of standard instructions).
97. Bethany K. Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury Instructions, and
Comprehension Issues, 67 TENN. L. REv. 701, 708 (2000) (footnote omitted).
Interestingly, in Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), thejury instructions stated:
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and in judging
of their credibility you have a right to take into consideration their
prejudices, motives, or feelings of revenge, if any such have been proven or
shown by the evidence in the case, if you believe from the evidence that any
witness or witnesses have knowingly and willfully testified falsely as to any
material factor point, you are at liberty to disregard entirely the testimony of

such witness or witnesses.
Id. at 60. Thus, very little has changed in instructing the jury on witness
credibility in over a century.
98. Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury
Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 589, 590 (1997) (classifying pattern
instructions as a "model set of instructions typically written by judicial or bar groups").
Pattern instructions have achieved such broad and consistent usage for several reasons:
First, they are designed to save judges and lawyers time, by eliminating the
need to write new instructions for every trial. Second, they should reduce the
number of appeals due to the use of incorrect instructions. Third, pattern
instructions ensure that jurors across similar cases hear the same instructions
regardless of thejudge's feelings about the case.
Id. at 590-91 (citations omitted); see also William W. Schwarzer, Communication with
Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 731, 737 (1981) (footnote omitted)
(stating the purposes of pattern jury instructions).
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time lawyers spend on crafting jury instructions, and they increase the
predictability of how the judge will instruct, assuming the judge uses
available pattern instructions. At least in theory, pattern instructions
decrease the frequency of appeals and reversals.9'"
Turning to the pattern model instructions for the federal courts,
one can summarize what they explain to jurors about memory and
10 0 When addressing the subject of memory,
demeanor: not much."

99. Schwarzer, supra note 98, at 737.
100. See, e.g.,
PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
THE FIRs CRcurr § 1.06 (1997), http://www.rid.uscourts.gov/mlenu/judges/jurycharges/
PJI.pdf ("In deciding what to believe, you may consider a number of factors,
including... the quality of the witness's memory... [and] the witness's manner
while testifying...."); THIRD CIRCUIT MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.7 (2010),
http://www.rid.uscourts.gov/menu/judges/jurycharges/OtherPjl/
3rd%2OCircuit%20Model%2OCivil%20Jury%20Instructions.pdf ("In deciding what
to believe, you may consider a number of factors, including.., the quality of the
[and] the witness's manner while
witness's understanding and memory...
testifying...."); FIFTH CIRCUIT PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CML § 3.1 (2014),
http://www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/fifth/2014civil.pdf ('You should keep
in mind, of course, that a simple mistake by a witness does not necessarily mean that
the witness was not telling the truth as he or she remembers it, because people may
forget some things or remember other things inaccurately. So, if a witness has made a
misstatement, you need to consider whether that misstatement was an intentional
falsehood or simply an innocent lapse of memory .. "); SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN
CRIMINALJURY INSTRUcTIONS § 1.07 (2014), http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/
crim_juryinsts/pdf/crmpattjur -full.pdf ("Ask yourself how good the witness's
memory seemed to be. Did the witness seem able to accurately remember what
happened?... Ask yourself how the witness acted while testifying. Did the witness
appear honest? Or did the witness appear to be lying?"); PATIERN CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 3.01 (2012), https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/
PatternJuryInstr/7th-criminal-jury-instr.pdf ("Some factors you may consider
include.., the witness'[s] memory... [and] the witness'[s] demeanor .. ");
MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DisTRIcr COURTS OF THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT § 3.03 (2014), http://wwwjuryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/model-civil jurya witness's
("You
may consider..,
instructions_2014_FINAL_20141210.pdf
memory... [and] how a witness acted while testifying ....In deciding whether to
believe a witness, remember that people sometimes hear or see things differently and
sometimes forget things. You will have to decide whether a contradiction is an
innocent misrecollection, or a lapse of memory, or an intentional falsehood; that
may depend on whether it has to do with an important fact or only a small detail.");
CIVIL § 1.11 (2007),
NINTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
http://www.akd.uscourts.gov/docs/general/model-jury-civil.pdf ("In considering
the testimony of any witness, you may take into account.., the witness's memory...
[and] the witness's manner while testifying .. ");TENTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.08 (2011), http://www.cal0.tLscouts.gov/sites/defaitt/files/clerk/
Panel%20Jury%2OInstnuction%202015.pdf ("I suggest that you ask yourself a few
questions:... Did the witness seem to have a good memory? ...And you should keep
in mind that innocent misrecollection-like failure of recollection-is not
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these instructions briefly mention "the quality of the witness's
memory"'"" and direct jurors to ask themselves "how good the
witness's memory seemed to be."'0 2 On the subject of demeanor,
"pattern jury instructions in virtually every state authorize jurors' use
of demeanor evidence to detect prevarication."103 The preferred
pattern instruction seems to be a variation of: you may consider the
manner of the witness while testifying. 1"
However, these "same
instructions offer little to no guidance as to how jurors should
undertake this task. Many jurisdictions simply tell jurors that a
witness's words and demeanor are relevant to credibility. Those that
go further provide only a little more."0 5 Indeed, the Georgia state
pattern instruction is as humorous as it is circuitous, advising jurors
to "believe the witnesses whom you think are most believable.." .... As
one commentator recently wrote, "[I] t is the jury's use of demeanor
evidence that is the most flawed."'
Moreover, jury determinations of witness credibility receive
extreme deference from the courts.
Federal appellate courts
overturn credibility determinations only where a witness's testimony is
impossible under the laws of nature or incredible as a matter of lawan extraordinarily high standard.'0
§ 3.4 (2013),
http://www.cal l.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/courtdocs/clk/FormCivilPatternJu
rylnstruction.pdf ("To decide whether you believe any witness I suggest that you ask
yourself a few questions: ...Did the witness seem to have a good memory? ....").
101. PATrERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE FIRST
CIRCUIT § 1.06.
102. SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN CRIMINALJURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.07.
103. Ren6e McDonald Hutchins, You Can't Handle the Truth! Trial Juries and
Credibility, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 505, 521 (2014) (footnote omitted).
104. See, e.g., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
THE FIRST CIRCUIT § 1.06.
105. Hutchins, supra note 103, at 523 (footnote omitted).
106. 2 SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL CASES, STATE OF GEORGIA
§ 0.01.00 (2005).
107. Hutchins, supra note 103, at 518.
108. See United States v. Shoemaker, 746 F.3d 614, 623 (5th Cir. 2014)
("Additionally, the jury is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of a witness, and
testimony generally should not be declared incredible as a matter of law unless it
pertains to matters that the witness physically could not have observed or events that
could not have occurred under the laws of nature.") (citation omitted); United
States v. Isaacson, 752 F.3d 1291, 1304 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 990
(2015) ("We will upset ajury's decision to credit a witness's testimony onlyin the rare
circumstance that the testimony is incredible as a matter of law. Testimony is
incredible as a matter of law only if it concerns facts that the witness physically could
not have possibly observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws of
uncommon."); ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CIVIL PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
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These pattern instructions have not kept pace with what science
teaches about both memory and demeanor. Perhaps this is not
surprising, given that a 1991 article noted that "[empirical] research
demonstrates that jurors have difficulty understanding traditional jury
instructions and suggests two procedural reforms: giving important
instructions at the beginning as well as the end of the trial[] and
The
providing jurors with written copies of their instructions."'
empirical
that
indicate
studies
author also opined that "[s]cattered
"
,,'
research has little or no impact on appellate courts ....
Pattern jury instructions signify an essential advance concerning
consistency, efficiency, and reducing error in the instruction process.
Nevertheless, "their use fails to address the lack of juror
nature.") (citation omitted); United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742, 754 (4th
Cir. 2011) ("The jury has already assessed the credibility of the witnesses, and this
court cannot do soon appeal."); United States v.Jones, 628 F.3d 1044, 1047 (8th Cir.
2011) ("A district court's finding that a witness's testimony is credible is only error in
extreme circumstances, such as when the witness testified to facts that are physically
impossible."); United States v. Cardinas Garcia, 596 F.3d 788, 794 (10th Cir. 2010)
("[W]e will overturn a jury's credibility determination and disregard a witness's
testimony only if the testimony is inherently incredible-that is, only if the events
recounted by the witness were impossible under the laws of nature or the witness
physically could not have possibly observed the events at issue."); United States v.
Hayes, 236 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2001) ("We will overturn a conviction based on a
credibility determination only if the witness testimony was incredible as a matter of
law. That is an exacting standard, and can be met, for instance, by showing that it
would have been physically impossible for the witness to observe what he described,
or it was impossible under the laws of nature for those events to have occurred at
all.") (citation omitted); United States v. M/G Transp. Servs., Inc., 173 F.3d 584,
588-89 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e do not weigh the evidence presented, [or] consider
the credibility of witnesses .. ");United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir.
1998) ("It is not for us toweigh the evidence or to determine the credibility of the
witnesses."); United States v. Ramos-Rascon, 8 F.3d 704, 708 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993)
("Although we normally must accept the jury's implicit determinations of credibility,
we are permitted to disregard inherently improbable testimony.") (citation omitted);
Borges v. Our Lady of the Sea Corp., 935 F.2d 436, 440 (1st Cir. 1991) ("We cannot
overturn a jury's credibility finding."); Auwood v. Harry Brandt Booking Off., Inc.,
850 F.2d 884, 890 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[W]e are not entitled to overturn the jury's
credibility evaluations or the inferences it chose to draw.").
109. J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts, Legislatures, and Commissions
Following EmpiricalResearch on Juiy Instructions,25 LAw & Soc'y REv. 155, 156 (1991).
For well over a decade, I have given every juror in both civil and criminal cases,
before opening statements, an individualized final set of jury instructions, in plain
English, complete with a table of contents. Because of my plain English requirement,
I almost always eschew the use of pattern instructions, except when sitting by
designation in the district courts of the Ninth Circuit, where their pattern
instructions are in plain English.
110. Id.
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comprehension ofjury instructions, a problem explicitly identified as
early as the 1970s. 'l l Thus, the daunting challenge of this Article is
to develop jury instructions that both incorporate what psychology
teaches about memory and demeanor and what linguistics teaches
This is especially
about instructing juries in plain English.1 12
because
assessing
witness
credibility using
important and challenging
boilerplate jury instructions "to evaluate witness credibility on the
basis of witness demeanor[] is probably counterproductive[,] since it
has been well established that demeanor evidence is worthless in
This
determining whether a witness is lying or mistaken." '
challenge helps guide the Proposed Model Plain English Witness
Credibility Instruction in the final section of this Article.
IV. JUROR MISUNDERSTANDING OFJURY INSTRUCTIONS, MEMORY,
AND DEMEANOR

A.

Generally

Social scientists, legal scholars, enlightened judges, and likely most
citizens that have served on juries have understood for years that jurors
often have substantial difficulty understanding jury instructions and
are frequently bewildered by them.'4 The legal community knows this
111. Bethany K. Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury Instructions, and
Comprehension Issues, 67 TENN. L. REv. 701, 709 (2000);see Charrow & Charrow, supra
note 96, at 1309 (detailing study showing thatjuries are easily confounded by overly
legalistic instructions, with negative implications for the jury system).
112. The 1979 study of plain English jury instructions by Charrow and Charrow
appears to be the first actual empirical study comparing standard pattern instructions
with a re-write in plain English.
We have not merely attempted here to demonstrate thatjury instructions are
inadequately understood; we have also attempted to isolate those linguistic
features typical of this brand of legalese-aspects of legal grammar,
structure-that
cause
the
semantics,
vocabulary,
and
discourse
comprehension problems. We have then used this knowledge to rewrite jury
instructions in a systematic fashion, and have empirically verified that such
rewriting can yield positive results.
Charrow & Charrow, supra note 96, at 1307-08.
113. Steven B. Duke et al., A Pictures Worth a Thousand Words: ConversationalVersusEyewitness
Testimony in Criminal Convictions,44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 38 (2007) (footnote omitted).
114. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 137 (1973)
(observing that jury instructions are "stereotyped, antiseptic statements of abstract
rules"); Walter M. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent
Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REv. 77, 77-78 (1988) ("Lawyers and judges have
suspected for some time, however, that many jurors do not understand their
instructions. These suspicions are confirmed by numerous reported cases in which
jury confusion peeks through. Recent social science research has demonstrated
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both from case law and from various scientific empirical studies. "5 I
know it from my experience as a federal judge."' Evenjurors who are
provided with a copy of the instructions before deliberating become
confused. In one study where the judge instructed on the elements of
assault and the jurors read the instruction and discussed it in
deliberations, over sixty-seven percent of the jurors incorrectly
7
understood that assault does not require a physical injury. "
Over several decades, studies have repeatedly demonstrated that
'jurors' comprehension of instructions is poor."". Across the studies,
social scientists have found that 'jurors do not understand a large
portion of the instructions presented to them."' 9
It is not
uncommon to find "overhalf the instructions misunderstood[-] even

empirically that juror comprehension of instructions is appallingly low. Some of that
research further demonstrates that rewriting instructionswith clarity as the goal can
dramatically improve comprehensibility. Despite these findings, and despite the
existence of books and articles explaining how to write instructions more clearly,
lawyers and judges continue to produce jury instructions that are incomprehensible
to juries.") (footnotes omitted); Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do jurors
Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror

Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 429 (1990) ("This research
supports a growing body of literature suggesting thatjury instructions are often lost
on jurors, and can sometimes even backfire. The relatively low rate of
comprehension for some concepts, both among more- and less-educated jurors, the
apparent ineffectiveness of instructions to improve comprehension, and the negative
effect of certain instructions, constitute the most striking findings ii the present
study.") (footnote omitted); see also Ben T. Head, Confessions of aJuror,44 F.R.D. 245,
336 (1967) ("A number of years ago, I served in a state court where the Judge
instructed us in language none of us understood. It was involved and tedious and
long, and so full of whereases and therewiths that he lost us halfway through.").
115. See Dumas, supra note 111, at 704 ("Information aboutjuror confusion comes
from several sources: case law reporting the contents of 'notes sent by jurors to judges
during deliberation,' 'cases from states that allow testimony about conversations among
jurors during deliberations,' and empirical evidence showing that rewritten
instructions providing context, synonyms for difficult terms, and shorter sentences are
much better understood than are pattern instructions.") (footnotes omitted).
116. Nearly a decade ago I "hired" (actual payment for expenses and time) former jurors
from my prior civil and criminal trials to come to the courthouse for an all-day session with a
facilitator to rewrite our stock instructions into plain English. Earlier, I found it was nearly
impossible to do this with the highly skilled law clerks I hired. They were brilliant, but plain
English was not their forte; rather, it was the legalese trappings of law school!
117. Kramer & Koenig, supra note 114, at 423.
118. Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches us About the
Jury InstructionProcess, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 589, 589 (1997).

119. Id. at 596.
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roughly [thirty percent] of
the most optimistic results indicate that
120
understood."'
not
are
the instructions
Yet, as the chart below establishes, federal and state court trial judges
have been very slow to implement recognized methods of enhancing
juror comprehension, including pre-instructing the jury on substantive
law, instructing them before closing arguments, and providing the
jurors with more than one copy of the written instructions:
S stte Out

FederalCour

Preinstructed on substantive law

17.7

16.9

Instructed before closing arguments

41.2

35.5

Given guidance on deliberations

54.4

52.7

At least [one] copy of written instructions provided

68.5

79.4

All jurors received copy of written instructions

32.6

39.0

JurooInstructionMAethods Cl

1

'

It has been empirically established thatjury instructions before testimony
can "be more effective than those presented afterwards,"'' 22 which is why it is
troubling that so few trial court judges pre-instructjuries on23 the substantive
law of the claims and defenses before opening statements. 1
The problem of juror confusion is magnified by commonly-given
jury instructions on memory and demeanor. This occurs because
such instructions tend to reinforce common myths and often ignore
or contradict cognitive psychological principles.

120.

Id. at 597.

JUDGE GREGORY E. MIZE et al., THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES
A COMPENDIUM REPORT 32 (2007),
IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS:

121.

SURVEY OF JURY

http://www.ncscjurystudies.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx.
122. Pager, supra note 92, at 427.
123. These are some of the reasons why, nearly fifteen years ago, I started
instructing jurors before opening statements with a full, final set of plain English
written instructions. The instructions contain plenty of bullet points and white
space, in contrast to the lengthy paragraphs of legalese that are so common in most
sets ofjury instructions.
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B. JurorMisunderstandingof Memory-What Science Teaches About Memory
The misunderstandingof how memory works
There is a consensus among memory experts that the ways in which
memory and perception work and apply in the courtroom are "not
within the knowledge of the average juror.""' Indeed, memory is a
far more intricate marvel than the average person can
Two of the leading experts on eyewitness
comprehend. 2 5
misidentification and memory have argued that the "justice26system
as a whole might have no theory" as to how memory works. 1
Rather than viewing memory as video or a TiVo playback system, as
mostjurors do, Professors Wells and Loftus have established that the
"process of recollection is reconstructive." 27 Thus, recollection of an
event is based on not only the perceptions of "the event itself[,] but
also from post-event information gleaned in various ways after the
event occurred."' 28 Memory can be so suggestive that even "mere
imagination" in some cases "make[s] people believe that they
witnessed or experienced an event that did not happen." 2 9 Decades
of cognitive psychological research has established that post-event
information can alter memory of an event, even in very "dramatic
ways. " ' The simple act of witnesses being asked to reconstruct the
experience "can cause the witness'Is] memory to change by
unconsciously blending the actual fragments of memory of the event
with information provided during the memory retrieval process." 13
A study of potential jurors in the District of Columbia found
significant "deficits of knowledge on the most basic level about how
memory works."" 2 The potential jurors tended towards viewing
memory as playback from a video camera and strongly overstated
1.

124. Derek Simmonsen, Comment, Teach Your Jurors Well: UsingJuyInstructions to
EducateJurorsAbout FactorsAffecting the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony, 70 MD. L. REv.
1044, 1054 (2011).
125. Id. at 1049.
126. WELLS & Lovrus, supra note 5,at 618.
127. Id.
128. Id.; see Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? TestingJurors' Understanding
of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRIcS J. 177, 195 (2006) ("[M]emory can
change in dramatic and unexpected ways because of the passage of time or...
exposure to 'post-event' information like conversations with other witnesses ....
129. WELLS & Lorus,supra note 5, at 618.
130. Id. at 621.
131. Schmechel et al., supra note 128, at 195.
132. Id. at 196.
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their belief that their own memory was excellent. 33 The study
suggested potential jurors likely started trials with an unwarranted
confidence in memory.13 4 In sum, current pattern jury instructions
do not "counteract deep-seated cognitive processes that most jurors
35
are unaware of and would adamantly deny are occurring."1
Courts have been aware of these problems for years. For example,
the Utah Supreme Court noted nearly thirty years ago that
"[research on human memory has consistently shown that failures
may occur and inaccuracies creep in at any stage of what is broadly
referred to as the 'memory process."1 36 The court wenton to observe
that "[t]his process includes the acquisition of information, its
storage, and its retrieval and communication to others. These stages
have all been extensively studied in recent years, and a wide variety of
factors influencing each stage have been identified." 31 7 The court
also astutely acknowledged that "[p]eople simply do not accurately
understand the deleterious effects that certain variables can have on
the accuracy of the memory processes of an honest eyewitness." 138
2.

The misinformationeffect
Recalling broken glass from a film clip (in which there was no broken
glass) about an auto accident after being primed with the word
"smashed"' 9 is an example of the misinformation effect.' ° The ability
to distort actual memories has been reported in "scores of studies,
involving a wide variety of procedures."' 4 In addition to the nonexistent
broken glass, people have recalled stop signs as yield signs, straight hair
as curly, screwdrivers instead of hammers, and a mustached man instead
of a clean-shaven person." 2 Even more surprisingly, study participants

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Pager, supranote 92, at 427.
136. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986).
137. Id. This case provides an excellent and detailed discussion of the problems at
each of the three stages of the memory process that were known in scientific research
almost thirty years ago. See id. at 488-91 (detailing the ways in which memory is
fallible, specifically evaluating the three acquisition stages, ultimately concluding
"that a more rigorous approach to cautionary instructions than this court has
heretofore followed is appropriate").
138. Id. at 490.
139. Loftus & Palmer, supra note 18, at 587-88.
140.

Id.

141. Wells & Loftus, supra note 5, at 621.
142. Id.
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have reported recalling "something as large and conspicuous as a barn
in a bucolic scene that contained no buildings at all." 143
Numerous studies conducted throughout the world demonstrate
the misinformation effect. The premise of this concept is that
memory is susceptible to human errors from exposure to post-event
information, including leading questions, 144 reports from others,
contact with other people, suggestions, one's expectations of self or
5 In one study, a
others, and even very small differences in language. 14
fake narrative induced greater false childhood memories of a nonexistent hot air balloon ride than a professionally doctored false
family photograph of the family in the hot air balloon."'
The media also plays an increasing role in the misinformation
effect, especially in civil and criminal litigation.141 Media coverage has
been described as "perhaps among the most common sources of
misinformation in Witness memory. " 48 An excellent example is the

143. Id.
144. Whether a leading question contains a definite article, such as "the," versus
an indefinite article, such as "a," can dramatically influence a witness's memory. In
one study, participants were asked about events that did and did not occur in a film
about an automobile accident. Half the participants were asked: "Did you see the..."
and the other half: "Did you see a .. " When the indefinite article "a" was used for an
item that did not appear in the film, a "yes" response occurred six percent of the time.
When the definite article "the" was used for the same question, a "yes" response occurred
twenty percent of the time. Elizabeth F. Loftus & Guido Zanni, Eyewitness Testimony: The
Influence of the Wording of a Question, 5 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC Soc'Y 86, 88 (1975).
145. Cara Laney & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Recent Advances in False Memory Research, 43
S. AFR.J. PSYCHOL. 137, 138 (2013).
146. Maryanne Garry & Kimberley A. Wade, Actually, A Picture is Worth Iess Than 45
Words: Narratives Produce More False Memories Than Photographs Do, 12 PSYCHONOMIC
BULL. & REv. 359, 359 (2005). For each of the subjects in the study, ranging in age
from eighteen to thirty, the researchers created a booklet of information from family
confederates containing photographs and narratives of four childhood events-three
real events (e.g., school functions, family trips) and one false event about a ride in a hot
air balloon. Id. at 360. Both the real and fake photographs were digitized and grayscaled and printed with identical resolution. Id. The hot air balloon photograph was
created with Adobe Photoshop and included at least one family member. Id. For the
narrative subjects, a personalized, but generic forty-five-word description of the balloon
ride was created. Id. This was the narrative: "When you were between [four and six]
years old, you and your [dad] went up in a hot air balloon in [Wanganui]. You didn't
go far off the ground because the ropes anchoring the balloon were still attached. It
was around May/June; a colder season." Id.
147. See generally Deborah Davis & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Internal and External Sources
of Misinformationin Adult Witness Memory, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY:
MEMORY FOR EvENTs 195, 208-09 (Michael P. Toglia et al. eds., 2007) (citing various
studies suggesting that media reports may distort witness memory).
148. Id. at 208.
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massive media coverage of the TWA Flight 800 crash twelve minutes
after takeoff from JFK International Airport on July 17, 1996. Within
days of the crash, the media began hyping a theory that the plane
4
This included graphic
had been shot down by a missile."'
illustrations of how a missile could have downed the plane. 150 The
testimony of witnesses was altered over time based on the extensive
media coverage.' 51 Thus, eventually 183 witnesses came forward
supporting the missile theory.' 5 2
A Dutch study of residents' memories of the crash of an El Al
Boeing 747 into an eleven-story Amsterdam apartment building is
equally illuminating. 53 In two combined studies, over sixty percent
of the subjects claimed they had seen the crash on TV, even though
no TV film of the crash ever existed. 5" The authors reported that "it
is relatively easy in a real life situation to make reasonably intelligent
adults believe that they have witnessed something they actually have
not seen themselves, but only heard reports about from others," and
to elicit reports about particular details of an event. 155 These so-called
"crashing memory" studies have consistently produced vivid
"'memor[ies]' of non-existent footage[] of a wide range of public
events." 156 In one study, thirty-eight percent of Swedish participants
in one study group and fifty-five percent in another claimed to have
seen non-existent film of the sinking of the Estonia ferry where 900
lives were lost. 157

In yet another study, sixty-three percent of

participants claimed to have seen non-existent film of the
assassination of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn; a stunning number of
the participants-twenty-three percent-offered details of the nonexistent films. 5' This suggests that "[m]emory is more prone to error

149.

Id.

150.

Id.

151.

Id.

152. Id. at 208-09.
153. Hans F.M. Crombag et al., Crashing Memories and the Problem of 'Source
Monitoring', 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 95, 95 (1996).
154. See id. at 97-104 (detailing the studies, methodologies, and outcomes).
155. Id. (providing examples of this ease from the various studies conducted).
156. Tom Smeets et al., 'OfC(ourse I Remember Seeing That Fim -How Ambiguous Questions
20 APPLIED COGNrIVE PSYcHOL. 779, 780 (2006) (citation omitted).
GeterateCrashingemie%
157. Id. (citation omitted).
158. Id. The authors' study demonstrated that crashing memories of non-existent
film footage depends, in part, on the ambiguous or suggestive nature of the
questions asked in the interviews. Id. at 786-88.
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than most people realize. Our memory system can be infused with
illusory memories of important events." 5 9
At the end of the last century, researchers, discontent with the mere
distortion of memories-remembering a barn where none existed-took
the existing cognitive research a step further by planting memories of
events that never occurred. 60 The first series of studies attempting to
implant false memories of "whole autobiographical events" became
known as the "lost in the mall" studies.' 6 ' In these studies, the participants
were told that their parents provided researchers with some memorable
events from their childhood. 61 2 This was true for some events but, in each
study, one manufactured childhood event was included after the parents
specifically disconfirmed the event (e.g., getting lost in a shopping mall, or
Following a series of suggestive
sustaining a serious accident).' 6 3
interviews, twenty to twenty-five percent of the participants self-reported
Over the span of ten studies, the
remembering the false event.164
percentage actually increased, and researchers found that a weighted
65
mean of thirty-seven percent had false memories of the planted event.
The "false memories produced in these studies were often detailed and
66
even emotionally laden for those who acquired them."'
Researchers, having established that they could induce false
memories in laboratory settings, created new techniques to test false
memories in the field.' 6 7 One creative study took the participants on
a walk around their college campus rather than having them perform
tasks in a laboratory. l" As they walked, the participants were asked to
both perform tasks and imagine performing others, or to observe the
experimenter perform tasks and imagine him or her performing
others.169 After a two-week interval, the participants had difficulty
70
differentiating between viewed, imagined, and experienced events.

159. Marko Jelicic et al., Assassination of a Controversial Politician: Remembering
Details from Another Non-Existent Film, 20 APPLIED COCNrrvE PSYCHOL. 591, 595 (2006)
(quoting Elizabeth Loftus, Our ChangeableMemories: Legal and PracticalImplications, 4
NATURE REvs. NEUROSCIENCE 231, 233 (2003))).

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

WELLS & LoFrus, supra note 5, at 621.
Laney & Loftus, supra note 145, at 139 (citationomitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. atl40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Some "falsely remembered performing some tasks they had only
imagined performing-including, rather absurdly, proposing
marriage to a Pepsi machine." 7 '
In a follow-up study, an
experimenter presented both bizarre and familiar action statements
to the participants such as "[s] hake hands with the fire hydrant" or
"[r]est on the fire hydrant."172 The study demonstrated that, two
weeks after simply imagining a person performing bizarre or familiar
actions during a campus walk, the participants falsely remembered
73
that the person actually performed those actions. 1
Another example of the misinformation effect is how one witness's
recollection can influence another's. There is direct evidence that this
witness "memory conformity" can occur with diverse stimuli such as
identification of faces, motor vehicles, details from written stories,
reports of criminal events, and various objects from a variety of scenes. 74
'
Witness memory-conformity studies establish "that discussions between
co-witnesses have great potential to influence the testimony of all
witnesses, with far-reaching consequences."175 Importantly, discussions
among co-witnesses may not only pollute memory, but may also
significantly boost a witness's confidence in information "confirmed" by
others. 76
' This becomes critical because, as discussed later in this Article,
jurors who determine that a witness is confident tend to find that witness
more credible.
This assumption occurs even though cognitive
psychology shows that there is little relationship between witness
confidence and accuracy.' 77 This insight is significant because jurors
often do not comprehend the potential influence witness cooperation
can have on memory and confidence.' 78 Instead, jurors falsely "assume
that confidence strongly reflects accuracy." 179

171. Id.; see John G. Seamon et al., Do You Remember Proposing Marriage to the Pepsi
Machine? False Recollections From a Campus Walk, 13 PSYCHONOMIc BULL. & REv. 752, 755
(2006) ("We found that imagining familiar or bizarre actions during a campus walk can
lead to the subsequent false recollection of having performed those actions.... The
present research extends previous work by demonstrating that these false recollections
can sometimes occur in a natural, real-life setting following just one imagining.").
172. John G. Seamon et al., Did We See Someone Shake Hands with a Fire Hydrant?:

Collaborative Recall Affects False Recollections From a Campus Walk, 122 AM. J. PSYCHOL.
235, 235 (2009).
173. Id. at 244.
174. Davis & Loftus, supra note 147, at 209.
175. Id. at210.
176. Id. at 211.
177. Schmechel, supra note 128, at 198-99.
178. Davis & Loftus, supra note 147, at 211.
179. Id.
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3.

Memory of oral conversation
Witness memories of oral conversations have been labeled "lt]he

[o]rphan [c]hild of [w]itness [m]emory [rlesearchers" because they
have not been studied as thoroughly as other memory issues. 8 0 From a
legal perspective, this seems odd because testimony about recollections
of oral conversations obviously plays a significant role in both civil and
criminal litigation and trials. From the corporate boardroom, to an
employee supervisor's office, to telephone conversations about the
formation of an oral contract, recollections of oral statements and
conversations are often pivotal to jurors' civil verdicts.
In my experience, the vast majority of criminal drug cases in
federal court are brought as conspiracy cases.
Thus, the coconspiracy exception to the hearsay rule, Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d) (2) (E), 8 l opens the floodgates to a host of oral statements
made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy by any of the coconspirators. 182 For example, who said what about the location and
operation of a drug stash house can be outcome determinative. It is
hard to imagine a civil or criminal jury trial where who said what to
whom, when, where, and under what circumstances is not at issue.
Just as witnesses' memories of specific persons, locations, objects, and
events are subject "to the same honest failures and distortions that
plague witness memories[,]" so too are witnesses' memories of oral
conversations
and
statements. 183
Moreover,
witnesses
to
conversations are 'Yore common, more likely to be inaccurate, more
likely to be believed by jurors[,] and more likely to produce
irreversible errors than eyewitness testimony."184

180. Deborah Davis & Richard D. Friedman, Memory for Conversation: The Orphan
Child of Witness Memory Researchers, in I HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY:
MEMORY FOR EVENTS 3, 3-4 (Michael P. Toglia et al. eds., 2007).
181. "A statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay: The
statement is offered against an opposing party and was made by the party's
coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy." FED. R. EvID.
801(d) (2) (E) (2015).
182. Botnjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 173, 175 (1987) (stating the text of
the co-conspiracy exception, and that "[b]efore admitting a co-conspirator's
statement over an objection that it does not qualify under Rule 801 (d) (2) (E), a court
must be satisfied that the statement actually falls within the definition of the Rule.
There must be evidence that there was a conspiracy involving the declarant and the
nonoffering party, and that the statement was made 'during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy."').
183. Davis, supra note 80, at 12-1.
184. Duke, supra note 113, at 45.
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"Source memory" refers to the situation in which a statement or
conversation occurred. 8 5 Researchers have identified at least ten
kinds of "source memory" issues in the context of recalling oral
statements or conversations:
" Who said what?
" To whom was something said?
" Did one actually say what one had considered, imagined, or
planned to say?
" In which conversation (of a number of possible conversations)
did a particular exchange take place?
" When or where did a particular exchange take place?
" In what order within a conversation or interaction did a
particular exchange take place?
* What other participants or witnesses were present, if any?
* What other features of the context or previous utterances
would alter the meaning of the target utterance?
" Was information acquired from a particular conversational
source or from some other medium?
* When planning a particular conversational contribution, has
one said these things to this person before?'
The first nine of these issues are pertinent to the legal
community.8 7 While a thorough discussion of these source memory
issues is beyond the scope of this Article,'"8 one interesting aspect of
"who said what" has been dubbed "unconscious plagiarism" or
cryptomnesia-the phenomenon of people remembering another's
statement as their own. 189
Studies have shown the frequency of cryptomnesia increases:
" With increasing delay between the original group interaction
and the subsequent attempt to generate novel contributions
* When the original information comes from a high- rather than
low-credibility source
" For contributions from a member of one's own sex (presumably a
more similar and, therefore, more easily confused source)
" When participants are distracted during the original
generation of ideas

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Davis, supra note 80, at 12-11.
Id. at 12-12.
Id.
For a thorough discussion of these memory issues, see id. at 12-11 to -23.
Id. at 12-15.
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" When retrieval occurs in a context different from that of the
original task
" For older participants'
While memory researchers have "largely neglected basic research
in [the] area" of recalling conversations and statements, "it is clear
that memory for conversation can and does fail for most, if not all, of
the reasons that memoryfor other events fails."' 9 1 Even though there
are few studies in this area, the studies conducted to date are
revealing and have led three scholars to conclude conversational
memory is of "astoundingly poor quality." 9' 2 Yet, despite this
research, conversational memory is greatly relied upon.' 93 In one
study, trained interviewers were asked immediately after the interview
to remember the questions they asked.' 94

They not only failed to

recall over eighty percent of their own questions, but also
misremembered asking mostly open-ended questions, when in fact
over eighty percent were closed-ended and thirteen percent were
leading.'9 5 Finally, research establishes that the "already-less-thanperfect memory immediately after a conversation undergoes
significant decay[,1 even after relatively short periods of time."'
Change blindness and metacognition
Change blindness refers to one's inability to see changes in
Metacognition, or
scenes-even large between view changes.' 97
"cognition about cognition" or "knowing about knowing," comes into
play in understanding that most people grossly overestimate their
own ability to detect changes, even significant ones, to scenes they
observe.'" In a classic study involving four differentchange-detection
scenarios (e.g., plates on a table changed from red to white; an actual
change in one of two actors in the scenario), only eleven percent of
the subjects actually perceived the changes, yet in the earlier identical
studies, eighty-three percent predicted they would be able to detect
In a related study, "ninety-seven percent of
the changes.'"
4.

190. Id.
191. Id. at 12-22 to-23.
192. Duke, supra note 113, at 16.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 15.
195. Id. atl5-16.
196. Id. at 31.
197. Daniel T. Levin et al., Change Blindness Blindness: The Metacognitive Error of
Overestimating Change-DetectionAbility, 7 VISUAL COGNITION 397, 397 (2000).
198. Id. at 398-99,405-09.
199. Id. at399-401.
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respondents estimated that they would succeed in an identification
task in which fifty percent of the actual participants failed." 20 In yet
another study, eighty percent of members of a Florida community
that were jury-eligible "overestimated the accuracy of identifications1
made by the store clerks who actually participated in a field study. "20
This phenomenon of failure to observe even significant changes "is a
pervasive feature of our visual lives. "202 Consequently, "the vast
majority of subjects [studied] thought they could detect changes that
few people actually do." 203

It appears that change blindness and

metacognition give both witnesses and jurors a false sense of accuracy
of memory and visual perception. Thus, change blindness suggests
people do not retain as many details in memory as they think they
do. 204 Moreover, they possess an extremely inaccurate understanding
2 05
of their and others' perceptive abilities.
C. JurorMisunderstandingofDemeanor-WhatScience TeachesAbout Demeanor
Overview
The jury's role in judging the credibility of witnesses is one of the
6
hallmarks of our state and federal civil and criminal judicial systems. 20
Demeanor evidence includes tone of voice, facial expressions, body
language, gestures, glances, gazes, eye contact, attitude, zeal,
confidence, and a host of other "cues," 2 7 such as the mantra of pattern
1.

jury instructions:

the "manner while testifying. '' 2 8

In his influential

article tracing the rise of juries as lie detectors, George Fisher,
Professor of Law at Stanford University, concluded that "[w] e could
perhaps regard the wonderful convenience of jury lie detecting with
more equanimity if there were any sound evidence that juries are good
200. Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV.
143, 154 (2011).
201. Id. at154-55.
202. Alva Nod, Is the Viumal WofId a GrandIllusion?, 9J. CONSciOUSNESS STuD. 1, 5 (2002).
203. Levin, supra note 197, at 408.
204. Erin M. Harley et al., The "Saw-It-All-Along" Effect: Demonstrations of Visual
Hindsight Bias, 30J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 960, 961 (2004).
205. Id.
206. Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 CONN.
L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2000); see Fisher, supra note 37, at 577 ("We say that lie detecting is
what ourjuries do best. Inthe liturgy of the trial, we name the jurors our sole judges
of credibility and call on them to declare each witness truthteller or liar.").
207. Rand, supra note 206, at 71-72; see also Blumenthal, supra note 31, at 1164
(explaining that jurors focus on outward physical behavior when instructed to use
demeanor as a way to measure a witness's credibility); Ogden, supra note 33, at 2.
208. See sources cited supra note 100 (containing some variation of this phrase).
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at this task. But most of the evidence we have suggests that juries have
no particular talent for spotting lies."200 In scientific studies, "[n]ot
only do experimental subjects rarely perform much better than chance
at distinguishing truth from falsehood, [] they think they are better lie
Professor Blumenthal has similarly
detectors than they are."21
explained:
"[TIhe long-standing confidence in the principle of
demeanor evidence

is unfounded....

"211

This is true because

empirical research has established that "ordinary subjects" cannot
consistently detect deception in a speaker's behavior, thus
demonstrating the "fallacy" of demeanor evidence.2 12 In fact, cognitive
psychological studies establish that "the cues ' jurors look to when
assessing credibility are actually the wrong ones. 213
Max Minzner, Professor of Law at the University of New Mexico
School of Law, has written about the divide between judges and
members of the legal academy on this issue.214 'Judges have generally
assumed juries make accurate credibility decisions and believe
demeanor is the mechanism for deciding whether a witness is telling
the truth."" 5 On the other hand, "[sitarting in the early 1990's,....
legal academics broke from this consensus view based on a series of
social science studies demonstrating that the test subjects in laboratory
experiments correctly determined when a person was lying only slightly
more than half the time. " "' However, Jennifer Bard, Professor of Law
at Texas Tech University School of Law, has observed that "[i]t has
become something of a legal academic truism that jurors are not
especially successfd at distinguishing between truth-tellers and liars."2" 7
Thus, I wholeheartedly agree with Ren6e Hutchins, Professor of Law at
the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, that, not
only has the time come to "lay bare the fiction that most firsthand

209. Fisher, supra note 37, at 707.
210. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Wellborn III, supra note 86, at 1082-88)
(summarizing studies).
211. Blumenthal, supra note 31, at 1159; see Ogden, supra note 33, at 3-4 ("Social
science research casts significant doubt on the core assumption behind the weight
given to demeanor evidence in making credibility determinations.").
212. Blumenthal, supra note 31, at 1159.
213. Hutchins, supra note 103, at 508.
214. See generally Minzner, supra note 36, at 2559-64 (discussing the differing views
of judges, who rely on demeanor evidence, and legal critics, who believe demeanor
evidence is inaccurate and therefore unhelpful).
215. Id. at 2558.
216. Id.
217. Bard, supra note 10, at 85.
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'
observers are well-suited to make credibility assessments,"218
but also
that it is seriously well past time to do so.

2.

The common sensefallacy
While all state and federal courtjudges likely implore jurors to use
and rely on their common sense in their jury instructions2 19 -is this
advice supported by cognitive science? If not, should judges continue
to do so? Because jurors' use of common sense is almost always
unguided, their "application of common sense to credibility may be
an instinct, a hunch[,] or an [i]nariculable gut reaction. 2 2 ° In
addition to causing misinterpretation of witness credibility, "common
sense" is an unfortunate invitation that may increase the untoward
22
role of implicit biases in judging witness credibility. 1
I am not the first to recognize that cognitive "psychological studies
call into question the judicial system's reliance on common sense to
assess the credibility of witnesses. ' 222 These studies indicate that
laypersons rely on inaccurate assumptions and misconceptions when
they assess the credibility of others. 223 This renders the notion of
"common sense" as a tool for accurately deciding credibility not
only
224
a "myth" but also a tool for "erroneous assessments of credibility."
However, by limiting or "restricting the accepted parameters of jury
common sense, " 225 common sense has less potential for mischief.
22 6
This is precisely the goal of my implicit biasjury instructions.
3.

The witness cuefallacy
A common misconception of demeanor evidence is that a witness's
trembling hand, shifty eye contact, stammering speech, or furrowed
218. Hutchins, supra note 103, at 508.
219. Id. at521-23.
220. Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility,
40 CASEW. RE. L. REV. 165, 177 (1989).
221. See, e.g., TUSHAR KANSAL, TiE SENTENCING POJECr, RACIAL DISIARITY IN
St
NCIN,.
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 1-3 (Marc Mauer, ed. 2005),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd-sentencing-review.pdf
(providing an overview of studies that overwhelmingly confirm the lingering implicit
bias that exists in the criminal justice system, resulting in disproportionate sentence
severity between white and non-white defendants).
222. Friedland, supra note 220, at 187.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 204.
226. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias injury Selection:
The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed
Solutions, 4 HARv. L. & POL'v REv. 149, 169 n.85 (2010).
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brow will be a telltale sign of that witness's credibility.227 The problem
is that, over many decades, cognitive psychological research has
established that witnesses do not "give off many of these most
cherished cultural stereotypes .. ."228 Even when they do, most of
society's "favorite cultural stereotypes about liars do not withstand the
test provided by the existing empirical data."22 The cognitive studies
simply do not support the cultural myths that liars have shifty eyes,
grimaces, nervous blinking, furtive glances, or even shifty bodies. 3 '
Pattern "Uj]ury instructions on 'demeanor' or 'manner and conduct'
focus jurors' full attention on what they see and obviate most, if not
all, chances that they will accurately detect deception."2"' This does
not bode well for jurors' abilities to detect truth-telling from
fabrication.
Reliance on this historically acceptable "demeanor
evidence" allows jurors to conclude that they are correctly ferreting
out deception when exactly the opposite is occurring.
4.

The accuracyfallacy

Another major fallacy of demeanor evidence is that most observers
believe they are far better at determining witness deception than they
actually are. A comprehensive study of deception perception through
many experiments found that the actual degree of accuracy is on
average about the same as the fifty percent chance level.232 Professor
Blumenthal has argued that the fundamental problem of demeanor
evidence, "glorified by the judicial process," is that "[s] ocial science has
produced overwhelming evidence refuting the ability of people to
identify that a witness is lying when the witness is actually being
deceptive."2 33 Indeed, false memories are often more consistent than
true memories. 234 This is because "false memories are more effectively
Moreover, as
reinforced by repetition than true memories. 23 5
witnesses retell a false memory, they become "more confident in [the]

227.

Rand, supra note 206, at 7.

228.

Id. at8.

229.
230.
231.
232.

Blumenthal, supra note 31, at 1192.
Id. at 1192-93.
Id. at1195.
Miron Zukerman et al., Verbal and Nonverbal Communication of Deception, 14
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 26 (1981) (assessing the results of the
accuracy of deception-detection studies by assessing the absence or the presence of
three cues: speech, body, and facial).
233.
234.
235.

Blumenthal, supranote 31, at 1163.
Duke, supra note 113, at 21.
Id.
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falsehood with each retelling."2"6 As demonstrated in the next section,
witnesses' confidence in their memory and testimony "is the primary
237
determinant of lay perceptions of credibility."
5.

The confidence fallacy
Unfortunately, research confirms jurors too often confuse witness
confidence with witness accuracy. "Our confidence in Ujurors']
238
ability-our ability-to sort truth from fiction is largely misplaced."
In the area of eyewitness identification, witnesses' confidence in their
identifications provides jurors with a false sense of reliability. 239
Psychologists suggest that a layperson's assumption that a witness's
confidence correlates positively with eyewitness accuracy is the most
2
glaring misconception of witness demeanor. 10
While most research on the confidence-accuracy ("CA") relationship
focuses on eyewitness identification of alleged perpetrators of crimes,
there is a growing body of related research in the civil law context.241
This research attempts to simulate issues related to product
identification in product liability litigation.24 2 In one study, the
participants were randomly paired as either the "actor" or "observer '24 3
in mixing six products for a cookie recipe: baking powder, baking
soda, chocolate chips, flour, salt, and sugar. 244 Four brands of each
product were spread randomly and equally among the participants,
but not the most recognized brands (i.e., Gold Medal flour or Arm and
Hammer baking soda). 245 The participants were then tested on their
memory of the actual brands used in the mixing after either five
minutes or one week.246 The actors and observers did not differ in
their accuracy. Observers displayed a higher CA correlation in both
236. Id.
237.

Id. at 24.

238. Hutchins, supra note 103, at 523.
239. Friedland, supra note 220, at 185-86; see Schmechel et al., supra note 128, at 198-200
(collecting studies on the weak correlation between eyewitness confidence and accuracy).
240. Friedland, supra note 220, at 185-86.
241. M. Amanda Earl Colby & Charles A. Weaver, III, ComparingEyewitness Memory and
Confidence for Actors and Observers in Product Identification Situations: ExtendingFindings and
Methodologyfrom CriminalJustice, 2 APPLIED PSYCHOL. CRIM.JUST. 145, 147 (2006).
242. Id. at 147-48.
243. The researchers used the actor/observer dichotomy because "[m]uch of the
testimony offered in product liability cases involves passive activity-that is, many
individuals are bringing suit against manufacturers of products they saw others use, as
opposed to products they used themselves." Id. at 148.
244. Id. at 151-52.
245. Id. at 152.
246. Id.
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the five-minute and one-week groups; there was substantially poorer
product recognition after one week. 247 The results evinced a strong
"familiarity bias." 248 After one week, the participants "were much more
likely to identify the product with which they were familiar than the
product they actually used."24 ' This is a critical finding because it
demonstrates "the reconstructive nature of eyewitness memory,"
especially after even a short delay of one week.250 Witnesses often
mistake "a sense of familiarity with true recollection. "2 1' Finally, the
researchers found little evidence that confident witnesses were more
accurate.2 52 Interestingly, while accuracy declined significantly over
253
the week, "subjective confidence did not.
Witness confidence actually produces a "double-whammy"
credibility determination by jurors. Jurors not only misread witness
confidence as a false proxy for accuracy, but they overestimate their
254
ability to determine whether witnesses are telling the truth.
In a 2002 study, researchers for the first time explored the
interaction between testimonial consistency or inconsistency, and
eyewitness confidence in mock juror judgments. 255 The researchers
found the jurors' perceptions of a witness's confidence were actually
more important than the consistency and/or inconsistency of their
testimony.2 5 6
Thus, the researchers' key findings were that
"[a] Ithough consistency is considered to be a key marker of accuracy,
its impact on judgments was weak and nonsignificant.... [and that]
[w] itness confidence had a strong influence on judgments, whether
testimony was consistent or inconsistent. "257
However, growing cognitive research and re-examination of prior
research in light of more sophisticated statistical analysis has drawn

247. Id. at 154-56.
248. Id. at 156.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 157.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Neil Brewer & Anne Burke, Effects of Testimonial Inconsistenciesand Eyewitness
Confidence on Mock-JurorJudgments,26 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 360 (2002) ("Although
previous research has explored interactions between confidence and other
forensically relevant variables, the interaction between testimonial consistency and
witness confidence-two variables which many sectors of the legal system consider to
be most diagnostic of testimonial accuracy-has not previously been examined.").
256. Id. at 361-62.
257. Id. at 353.
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into question whether there is a stronger witness-CA relationship, 2 at
58
least in terms of eyewitness identification, than previously thought.
Notwithstanding this development, the consensus among CArelationship researchers is well summarized as follows:
Many outside of the research community consider an eyewitness'
level of subjective confidence to be a valid indicator of his or her
accuracy. This is typically evident in a courtroom setting where
officials and jurors tend to give the most credence to witnesses who

appear very confident. Contrary to this popular belief, a person's
level of subjective confidence is not a valid indicator of his or her
accuracy. Most scientific studies have found the CA relationship to
be relatively weak or nonexistent; in fact, this is one of the most
25
consistent findings in the memory research literature. 9

In 2005, the Georgia Supreme Court abandoned its pattern jury
instruction that jurors may consider "the level of certainty shown by
the witness" during their eyewitness identification testimony. 260 The
court noted that "the idea that a witness's certainty in his or her
identification... reflect[s] the witness's accuracy has been 'flatly
contradicted by well-respected and essentially unchallenged empirical
studies.' 261
Fifteen years earlier, in Krist v. Eli Lilly & Co., 262 the
Unites States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed: "An
important body of psychological research undermines the lay
intuition that confident memories of salient experiences... are
accurate .... [T]he mere fact that we remember something with
great confidence is not a powerful warrant for thinking it true....

258. Matthew A. Palmer et al., The Confidence-Accuracy Relationship for Eyewitness
Identification Decisions: Effects of Exposure, Duration, Retention Interval, and Divided
Attention, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 55, 57 (2013) (referring to the
optimality hypothesis, which predicts that the confidence-accuracy ("CA")
correlation will be stronger when better "processing conditions" enable witnesses to
make more appropriate confidence estimates). But see Elizabeth R. Tenney et al.,
Calibration Trumps Confidence as a Basis for Witness Credibility, 18 PSYcHOL. SCI. 46, 46
(2007) (explaining that two experiments establish that testimonial errors hurt the
credibility of confident witnesses more than witnesses lacking confidence).
259. Kevin Krug, The Relationship Between Confidence and Accuracy: Current Thoughts
of the Literatureand a New Area of Research, 3 APPLIED PSYCHOL.CRIM.JUST. 1, 31 (2007).

260. Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 771 (Ga. 2005). The court also acknowledged
that although Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972) held that a witness's "level of
certainty" was a legitimate factor for the jury to consider in eyewitness identification
cases, cognitive psychology studies proved this assertion clearly erroneous. Id. at 7 70 .

261. Id. (citing State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 491 (Utah 1986)).
262. 897 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1990).
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[A]ccuracy of recollection is not highly correlated with the
recollector's confidence . "...263
Thus, cognitive psychology teaches that most observers are not wellsuited to accurately determine the credibility of witnesses. This is due, in
part, to the common sense, witness cue, and confidence fallacies that
undermine ajuror's ability to successfully determine witness credibility.
V.

PROPOSED MODELJURY INSTRUCTIONS ON WITNESS CREDIBILITY

Unfortunately, as this Article establishes, the law's recognition and
incorporation of cognitive psychological principles is extremely
limited. The legal sensibilities required for properly guiding jurors in
their ultimate task of determining witnesses' credibility are often
missing. Jury instructions have been markedly consistent for decades,
if not longer, regarding how little jurors are told about determining
The standards for determining witness
witnesses' credibility.
credibility have persisted as if frozen in time, based on myth, and
completely unconnected with current knowledge of cognitive
psychology. Thus, there are compelling reasons to update current
pattern jury instructions on the credibility of witnesses, or, at a
minimum, to increase attention given to them and to initiate a
discussion about what updated instructions should look like.
The Oregon Supreme Court has noted the compelling reasons for
Indeed, in the context of current
supporting a new approach. 2"
cognitive psychological knowledge on eyewitness identification, that
court recently observed: "Based on our extensive review of the current
scientific research and literature, we conclude that the scientific
knowledge and empirical research concerning eyewitness perception
and memory has progressed sufficiently to warrant taking judicial notice
of the data contained in those various sources as legislative facts . "2
Nearly thirty years ago, the Utah Supreme Court mandated that its
courts provide juries with a routine cautionary instruction in the
context of eyewitness identification. 66 This mandate was meant to
guide trial courts in giving an instruction sensitizing the jury "to the
factors that empirical research ha[s] shown to be of importance in
determining the accuracy of eyewitness identifications, especially
those that laypersons most likely would not appreciate."267

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. at 296-97 (emphasis in original).
State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 749-50 (Or. 2012) (en banc).
Lawson, 291 P.3d at 740.
Long, 721 P.2d at 492.
Id.
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In State v. Henderson,2" 8 the most significant eyewitness
identification case in modern times, the New Jersey Supreme Court,
269
relying in part on a Special Master's lengthy and detailed report,
recognized that "science abundantly demonstrates [that] the many
vagaries of memory encoding, storage, and retrieval; the malleability
of memory; the contaminating effects of extrinsic information[ ,] ..
and [] many other factors [] bear on the reliability" 270 of witnesses'
memories. The court also recognized the need for better jury
instructions reflecting the cognitive psychological evidence presented
27 1
in the record and adopted by the court in its sweeping decision.
Finally, in furtherance of implementing its decision, the court
requested that the state Criminal Practice Committee and the
Supreme Court Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges "draft
proposed revisions" to New Jersey's jury instructions.272 The Report
of the Supreme Court Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges
on the Revisions to the Identification Model Charges 27 contains a
discussion of the disagreement as to whether the new instructions
should directly refer to "scientific research" in the language of the
proposed instructions, as the court did in Henderson.274
The
Committee ultimately decided to excise specific references to
"scientific research" in the language of the proposed instructions. 7 5
I disagree with this decision for many of the very same reasons
stated in the Hendersonopinion. First, the court observed that "the
Special Master found 'that laypersons are largely unfamiliar' with

268. 27A.3d. 872 (N.J. 2011).
269. This report contained more than 2000 pages of transcript based on seven
experts' testimony and over 200 published scientific studies of witness memory and
eyewitness identification. Id. at 877; see supra note 4 (discussing the effects of including
detailed descriptions of scientific findings with juries on perceived witness reliability).
270. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 916. The court also found that the record of the Special
Master's Report represents the "gold standard in terms of the applicability of social
science research to the law." Id. The court found that "[e]xperimental methods and
findings have been tested and retested, subjected to scientific scrutiny through peerreviewed journals, evaluated through the lens of meta-analyses, and replicated at
times in real-world settings." Id.
271. Id. at 925-26.
272. Id. at 925.
273. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON MODEL CRIMINAL JURY CHARGES, REPORT OF THE
SUPREME COURT COMMITrEE ON MODEL CRIMINAL JURY CHARGES ON THE REVISIONS TO

(2012), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/
criminal/ModelCrimJuryChargeCommHENDERSONREPORT.pdf.
274. Id. at 5-6.
275. Id. at 6.
THE IDENTIFICATION MODEL CHARGES
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scientific findings and 'often hold beliefs to the contrary."'"76
Second, the court held that while the research on what jurors know
about scientific findings regarding witness memory is not "definitive,"

it does "reveal generally that people do not intuitively understand all
of the relevant scientific findings."2 77 In my opinion, using phrases
like "scientific findings" helps "promote greater juror understanding
of those issues."27' 8 Precisely because most potential jurors do not
understand the cognitive science behind current scientific thinking
about witness memory and demeanor-and often hold views that are
totally contrary to these findings--overcoming these obstacles is best
promoted by emphasizing and explaining the term "scientific
findings" in the jury instructions. Because the Proposed Model Plain
English Witness Credibility Instruction that follows asks jurors to
overcome their intuition and common sense, which often run
counter to the cognitive scientific principles supporting the
instruction, special emphasis on "scientific research" isjustified.
Based on the research in this Article, I offer, for use by state and
federal trial court judges and for further critique by them and
members of the academy,27 ' the following Proposed Model Plain
English Witness Credibility Instruction:

276. Henderson, 27A.3dat910.
277. Id. at 911.
278. Id.
279. In the only study of its kind, Professor Robinson and his colleagues attempted
to measure the efficacy of NewJersey's new eyewitness identification instruction. Athan
P. Papailiou et al., The Novel New Jersey Eyewitness [nstruction Induces Skepticism But Not
Sensitivity, ARIZONA
LEGAL STUD.
DISCUSSION
PAPER No.
14-17
(2014),

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475217. Using a "2x2 between-subject design," 335 mock
jurors viewed a thirty five-minute video of a murder trial where the "quality [of the
identification] was either 'weak' or 'strong' and either the New Jersey or a 'standard'
jury instruction was delivered." Id. at 1. The New Jersey instruction substantially
reduced juror reliance on weak eyewitness identification compared to the standard
instruction. Id. at 17. However, the New Jersey instruction "equally reduced juror
reliance on strong identification evidence." Id. at 18. The authors note that "it might
still be an improvement over the 'standard' instruction, at least if one agrees with
Blackstone's argument that reducing false positives is more important than reducing
false negatives ('better that ten guilty persons escape than one innocent suffer.')." Id.
This is powerful evidence that the propriety of praising or criticizing my proposed
instruction can best be determined only after the completion of an empirical study.
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No. _--TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES""
You may believe all of what any witness says, only part of it, or none
of it. In evaluating a witness's testimony, consider the witness's:
* Opportunity to have seen and heard what happened;
" Memory. Memory is not an exact recording of past events and
witnesses may misremember events and conversations.
Scientific research has established that:
o human memory is not at all like video recordings
that a witness can simply replay to remember
precisely what happened;
o when a witness has been exposed to statements,
conversations,
questions,
writings,
documents,
photographs, media reports, and opinions of others, the
accuracy of their memory may be affected and distorted;
o a witness's memory, even if testified to in good faith, and
with a high degree of confidence, may be inaccurate,
unreliable, and falsely remembered; thus, human
memory can be distorted, contaminated, or changed, and
events and conversations can even be falsely imagined;
o distortion, contamination, and falsely imagined
memories may happen at each of the three stages of
memory: acquisition (witnessing the event); storage
(period of time between acquisition and retrieval);
and retrieval (recalling the information);
" Demeanor. Scientific research has established that:
o there is not necessarily a relationship between how
confident witnesses are about their testimony and the
accuracy of their testimony; thus, less confident witnesses
may be more accurate than confident witnesses;
o common cultural cues, like shifty eyes, shifty body
language, the failure to look one in the eye,
grimaces,
stammering
speech,
and
other

280. Much of this instruction, other than the text about memory and demeanor,
comes from my longstanding plain English witness credibility instruction that I have
used in all civil and criminal cases for many years. A previous iteration of the
instnlction included, as the first bullet point, the witness's "intelligence," a factor
commonly found in pattern witness credibility instructions. Because I doubt there is
any empirical evidence supporting the proposition that a witness's "intelligence" has
anything to do with credibility, I have removed it. I have used this new witness
credibility instruction in all civil and criminal jury trials since early January 2015
without objection from counsel.
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mannerisms, are not necessarily correlated to witness
deception or false or inaccurate testimony;
* Motives for testifying;
" Interest in the outcome of the case;
" Drug or alcohol use or addiction, if any;
" The reasonableness of the witness's testimony.
" In evaluating a witness's testimony, also consider the following:
o any differences between what the witness says now
and said earlier;
o any inconsistencies between the witness's testimony
and any other evidence that you believe; and
o whether any inconsistencies are the result of seeing or
hearing things differently, actually forgetting things,
or innocent mistakes or are, instead, the result of lies
or phony memory lapses.
If the defendant testifies, you should judge his testimony in the
same way that you judge the testimony of any other witness.
CONCLUSION

Judging witness credibility is the soul of our nation's criminal and
civil justice systems. This Article calls into serious question whether
judges are currently giving jurors the necessary tools to perform this
critical task to the best of their abilities. The overview of cognitive
psychological studies on witness memory and demeanor demonstrates
the significant attention social scientists have given to problems with
witness memory and demeanor as tools for judging credibility.
Unfortunately, judges still instruct on these issues the same way they
have for a century and thus give jurors virtually no information on
these important principles.
Thousands of studies establish solid cognitive psychological
principles revealing that memory can be distorted, contaminated,
and even falsely imagined and recalled. Scientific research on witness
demeanor clearly establishes that common cultural cues used by
jurors, including the confidence of witnesses in their own testimony,
are not meaningful proxies for the accuracy or truthfulness of that
testimony. Indeed, common juror misconceptions about witness
memory and demeanor are often contrary to the now well-established
cognitive psychological principles examined in this Article. As a
solution, this Article offers a Proposed Model Plain English Witness
Credibility
Instruction incorporating
contemporary
cognitive
psychological principles. As law and psychology inevitably continue
to intersect, broader policy issues will need to be resolved.
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Like the television infomercial tag line, "[b]ut wait, there's
' there are big picture questions lurking as courts enhance
more!,"281
jurors' determinations of witness credibility. Why has there been
such a substantial lag between the acceptance of well-established
cognitive psychological principles in the social science domain as
compared with the legal arena? What standard should courts use
when relating cognitive psychological principles to legal doctrine?
How settled must cognitive psychological principles be in social
science before courts act on them? How can cognitive psychologists,
lawyers, and judges promote a more complete, cross-discipline
understanding for better-informed solutions to problems at the
intersection of law and psychology?
The intersection of law and cognitive psychology's expanding
frontier will engage lawyers, judges, members of the academy, and
cognitive psychologists in discussions for years to come. There will be
new and perplexing issues with uncertain resolutions. But, on the
issue of enhancing current pattern jury instructions on witness
memory and demeanor to assist jurors in ascertaining witnesses'
credibility, the time is ripe for judicial action. The time is now. My
hope is this modest Proposed Model Plain English Witness Credibility
Instruction moves this issue forward. In doing so, greater faith in the
mysterious process of assessing witness credibility might be achieved
and, as a result, the quest for justice will be advanced.

281. Ron Popeil, an American inventor and infomercial personality, is credited
with using the phrase "But wait, there's more!" on late-night television infomercials.
Kate Bratskeir, 8 Reasons You Shouldn't Underestimate the Greatness of Ron Popeil
HUFFINCTON POST (Oct. 6, 2014, 9:07 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/10/06/ron-popeil-facts-wow n-5926408.html.

